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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between the strength of safety climate and the 
orientation towards safety in a decision-making process (Safety Decision-Making). The study 
attempted to answer the following question: Can the strength of a safety climate predict safer 
decision-making process and choice?  
 
Two web-based instruments have been utilized to address the question above: a safety 
climate survey followed by decision-making simulation (Decision Mind TM). 
 
The study was conducted in a manufacturing facility in Iowa. It included 111 of the 186 
employees in the facility. The results indicated that an aggregated measure of the strength of 
safety climate was a significant predictor of the choice of a safer alternative. However, the 
correlation between the strength of safety climate and a safety-oriented decision process was 
not found to be significant. 
 
Keywords: safety climate; safety decision-making.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The effects of safety climate on safety performance (behavioral safety) remain a paradox 
to both, practitioners and researchers alike. Although there is a significant correlation between 
safety climate and safety behaviors, careless behaviors still prevail during work functions 
(DeJoy, 1994, & 2005; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Zohar & Erev, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2003). 
These unsafe behaviors present an immense managerial challenge (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Prussia, Brown, & Willis, 2003; Smith, Huang, Ho, & Chen, 2006). This challenge is evident in 
the fact that forty percent of work accidents and occupational diseases are the result of 
employees’ failure to use mandatory personal protective gear (National Safety Council [NSC], 
1999). Statistically, this forty percent (NSC, 1999) has not changed in more than twenty years, 
despite the fact that the correlation between safety climate and safety behaviors was established 
five and a half decades ago (Fleishman, 1953; Guldenmund, 2000). Even in an environment 
where safety behavior should be paramount, such as the National Aeronautical and Space 
Administration (NASA), this paradox is evident (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
[CAIB], 2003). Following the loss of the Columbia Space Shuttle, a report by the CAIB (2003) 
showed that NASA failed to support its stated commitment to put safety first. This report 
explained that NASA was committed to the concepts of safety but not to the actual practices. The 
failure to practice commitment to safety is not limited to NASA; it is a widespread concern and 
occurs in various industries daily. 
Zohar and Luria (2005) conducted a study to illustrate this failure to practice commitment 
to safety. In the study, workers’ behaviors were observed by line managers and safety 
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professional in 423 workgroups across general industrial sectors. The study indicated that each 
company had an incident rate over thirty three percent for unsafe behaviors. 
Behavioral safety uses the Antecedents-Behavior-Consequences (ABC) framework 
(Luthans & Kreitner, 1985; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997). ABC framework focuses on two 
antecedents, training and goal setting associated with target safety behaviors (i.e., housekeeping, 
earplugs), and two types of consequences (i.e., feedback and incentive). The notion of 
consequences refers to reinforcement (Skinner, 1974). Reinforcement refers to any behavior-
contingent outcome that influences the frequency of preceding behaviors (Geller, 1996). In most 
cases, intervention is based on publicly displayed feedback charts, based on observations by 
external observers or co-workers (Krispin & Hantula, 1996). While these intervention methods 
provide some of the necessary incentives for change (Lingard & Rowlinson, 1997), workers are 
still engaging in unsafe behaviors. Safety climate researchers (Amabile, Schatzel, Moneta & 
Kramer, 2004; Fleishman, 1953; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2003) believe that some of these 
unsafe behaviors are influenced by specific organizational factors. 
1.2 Safety Climate 
 
According to the existing literature on safety climate, there have been several progressive 
definitions for safety climate. However, the core definition that solidified the fundamental 
meaning of safety climate states that, “safety climate is employees’ perceptions of the priority 
given to safety over productivity (Zohar, 1980, p. 97).” As early as the 1950s, this perception of 
the priority given to safety over productivity has been correlated to employees’ safety behaviors 
(Fleishman, 1953). Despite this significant finding, little has been done to establish the best 
managerial practices to reduce employees’ unsafe behaviors (Zohar & Erev, 2007). In order to 
understand decision behaviors, research efforts need to focus on decision-making processes (e.g., 
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perceptual, cognitive, information acquisition) that cause human behaviors to deviate from that 
predicted by normative models (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mellers, 
Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992; Rothman & Salovey, 1997; Shafir, 
Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Simon, 1955 & 1979). Unfortunately, decision-making processes 
have only been studied implicitly, rather than directly. Implicit studies of decision-making 
address theoretical frameworks and expectations. For example, current efforts to understand 
these processes are typically devoted to designing psychometric measuring instruments and 
determining their underlying factor structures (Brown & Homles, 1986; Coyle, Sleeman, & 
Adams, 1995; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Garavan & O’Brien, 2001). While this is an 
important aspect of understanding the concepts of decision-making, it does not provide a 
complete picture. Therefore, this study argues that the missing link between safety climate and 
safety behaviors lies with understanding actual decision-making processes. 
1.3 Decision-Making 
 
Buchanan and O’Connell (2006) claimed that decision-making has been an area of 
interest to humankind since the fourth century, since Aristotle argued that in order to understand 
choice, useful knowledge gained through sensing and deductive reasoning should be important. 
This interest lies in the fact that human beings are continuously engaged in decision-making 
processes that are made up of a variety of facets. Decision-making, a process that is guided by a 
set of rules, involves acquiring and weighing accessible information in order to select the “best” 
alternatives (Simon, 1955 & 1979; Mintz, 1993; Mintz & Geva 1997; Mintz, Geva, Redd, & 
Carnes, 1997). Decision rules, theories, and models have been developed to predict, quantify, 
and measure people’s decision-making processes. 
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Based on the fundamental concepts of the models and theories of decision-making 
processes, a new concept is defined in this study: safety decision-making. This new concept is 
defined as the process of selecting a safe alternative through information acquisition based on 
safety training, personal beliefs, values, previous experience, and accessible safety information. 
This study is innovative in its approach to finding one of the relationships between safety climate 
and safety decision-making. 
1.4 Problem 
 
The purpose of safety climate research is to provide safety professionals with effective 
solution to ongoing careless behaviors in industry (NSC, 1999). However safety climate has yet 
to gain industry wide acceptance (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). Researchers have yet to combine the 
body of knowledge on safety climate and safety behaviors into a recommendation for best 
managerial practices to reduce unsafe behaviors in the workplace (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, Prussia et al., 2003; 1993; Schneider, 2000; Smith et al., 2006; 
Zohar & Erev, 2007). Thus, this study suggests that this lack of insight might have a causal 
relationship to managers’ inability to solve persistent unsafe behaviors in the workplace. As a 
result, despite the time and effort spent on safety and safety training, the work environment is 
still plagued by employees who make poor and unsafe decisions (Payne, Bergman, Henning, & 
Stufft, 2006; Zohar & Luria, 2003; Zohar & Erev, 2007). Employees who make poor and unsafe 
decisions are apparent in the manufacturing environment (Zohar & Luria, 2003; Zohar & Erev, 
2007). This is due to the fact that the manufacturing industry is a leading work environment, 
where incidents and injuries occurs daily (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], U.S. Department of 
Labor [DOL] 2005, http://www.bls.gov). Because of the problems concerning safety in the 
manufacturing industry, this study seeks to examine a possible additional missing link (safety 
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decision-making) between safety climate and safety behaviors within a manufacturing 
environment. 
1.5 Structure of this Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of safety climate on safety decision-
making processes and choice in a manufacturing environment. The study starts with a literature 
review. The literature on safety climate will discuss several problematic issues associated with 
safety climate research. The literature on decision-making will be selective in nature (relevant to 
the study), because of the extensive research conducted on decision-making. A new concept of 
safety decision-making is discussed later in this study, and a variety of indices will be reviewed 
during the course of the research. Safety oriented information acquisition processes will be 
among these indices. This information will be used to address possible correlation between 
safety climate factors and safety decision-making. Lastly, this study includes research 
methodology, two null hypothesis, analysis, and results sections. These sections are followed by 
discussion, recommendations, and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 Initially, this section reviews literature on safety climate, which is followed by a review 
of decision-making scholar efforts. 
 One of the purposes of measuring safety climate is to inform practitioners on improving 
safety performance (Carroll, 1998). This effort has been on-going for the past five and a half 
decades (Guldenmund, 2000). For these five and a half decades industrial organizations have had 
a major interest in safety climate efforts since they are major stakeholders (Wallace, Popp, & 
Mondore, 2006). This is due to on-going concerns with work accidents and occupational diseases 
within industrial environments. 
Despite these concerns, safety climate researchers have not reached a consensus on an 
assessment methodology that addresses the relationship between safety climate and safety 
behaviors (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000). Since human actions require that a 
decision be made, there is a need to understanding decision-making process, as well, with respect 
to organizational factors such as safety climate. 
2.2 Inconsistencies in Defining Safety Climates 
 
Early efforts in safety climate research can be traced backed to the 1950s (Fleishman, 
1953). Fleishman (1953) conducted a study on the relationship between safety climate and safety 
performance, which revealed that the strength of safety climate was highly correlated with the 
behaviors and attitudes of foremen in industrial settings. By the early 1970s, attempts were made 
to categorized safety climate criteria and dimensions (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 
1970). Campbell et al. (1970) posited four major dimensions of safety climate, which are: 
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• Individual autonomy, 
• Degrees of structure imposed on the job functions, 
• Reward orientation, and 
• Consideration, warmth, and support. 
These safety climate dimensions were later solidified by Zohar (1980), who suggested 
that safety climate is a coherent set of perceptions and expectations that employees have 
regarding the company’s priority of safety over productivity. Byrom and Corbridge (1997) built 
upon Zohar’s (1980) definition of safety climate as the employees’ shared perceptions of how 
safety management is being operated in the workplace, at a particular moment in time. Zohar 
(2002) further suggest that safety climate evolves. This evolution is characterized by the 
individuals who occupy the environment, and this evolution can change on the basis of certain 
inputs (i.e., organizational climate, leadership). Neal, Griffin, and Hart (2000) generalized 
Byrom and Corbridge’s (1997) definition to be a specific form of organizational climate that 
describes individual perceptions of the value of safety in the workplace. Wallace et al. (2006) 
further suggest that safety climate is the shared perceptions of emphasis of safety-related 
policies, procedures, and practices. Based on the review of these definitions this study argues 
that there have been inconsistencies in defining safety climate. Although researchers have made 
significant progress in defining safety climate, these inconsistencies have deterred them from 
reaching a consensus on an assessment methodology. 
2.3 Safety Climate Assessment Approach 
 
 A Meta analysis of safety climate assessment methods, over the past twenty five years, 
has grouped safety climate assessment methods into four categories (Cooper & Phillips, 2004): 
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• Designing psychometric (design, administration, and interpretation of quantitative 
tests for the measurement of psychological variables such as intelligence, 
aptitude, and personality traits) measurements and determining their underlying 
factors (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Coyle et al., 1995; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 
1991; Garavan & O’Brien, 2001; Zohar, 1980), 
• Developing and testing theoretical models of safety climate to determine factors 
of safety behaviors and accidents (Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, & Tomas, 1998; Neal et 
al., 2000; Prussia et al., 2003), 
• Safety performance-oriented climate (Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Zohar, 2000), 
and 
• Linking safety climate and organizational climate (Neal et al., 2000; Silva, Lima, 
& Baptista, 2004; Wallace et al., 2006; Zohar, 2000; 2002). 
 Psychometric [safety climate] instruments are deliberately designed to discriminate 
between people on various demographic dimensions (Cook, Hepworth, Wall, & Warr, 1993). 
Thus, differences between sub-groups only inform about the degree to which the measure has 
reached its initial design goals. They do not assess or predict actual ongoing safety performance. 
Moreover, correlating demographic data to safety climate questionnaire responses is neither 
concurrent validation (e.g., safety performance at the time of distribution of survey) nor 
predictive validity (e.g., forecast future safety performance) (Bausell, 1986). 
 Some researchers have tried to assess concurrent or predictive validity by correlating the 
factor scores against accident rates, human error analysis, expert rating, rating of behavioral 
compliance, and safety behavior (Arboleda, Morrow, Crum, & Shelley, 2003; Diaz & Cabrera, 
1997; Garavan & O’Brien, 2001; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Lee & Harrison, 2000; Mearns, 
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Whitaker, & Flin, 2001; Niskanen, 1994; O’Toole, 2002; Silva et al., 2004; Varonen & Mattila, 
2000; Vredenburgh, 2002; Zohar, 2000). The only evidence of a predictive relationship between 
a safety climate instrument and safety behaviors was found by Zohar (2000), whose findings 
showed a strong predictive relationship between safety climate and “micro-accident” (i.e., 
behavior dependent on-the-job, minor injuries needing medical attention). However, all other 
research efforts have had unsuccessful outcomes in contributing to Zohar’s (2000) findings. 
Other methods of finding a predictive relationship between safety climate and safety 
performance are the developing and testing of theoretical models of safety climate. The purpose 
of this method is to determine factors relating to safety behaviors accidents (Cooper & Phillips, 
2004). 
 Some theoretical models of safety climate attempt to understand the relationship between 
construct of safety climate models and self-reported indices such as: appraisals of work 
environment, work hazards, managerial assessments of employees’ safety compliance, safety 
hazards, and self-reported compliance (Brown & Homles, 1986; Cheyne et al., 1998; Neal et al., 
2000; Thompson, Hilton, & Witt 1998). The correlation between safety climate models and self-
reported safety activities has only a moderate association at best (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). This 
moderate association is a result of the inflation of the correlation between two perceptual 
constructs (Miller & Monge, 1986). For this reason, it is difficult to rely on the validity of 
theoretical models in finding a relationship between safety climate and safety performance. 
Overwhelmingly, this body of research suggests that there is no direct link between perceptual 
safety climate constructs and actual safety behaviors (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). Another reason 
for the difficulty in finding a relationship between safety climate and safety behaviors is the 
problem of accurately measuring safety performance. 
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 Measurement of safety performance is made up of such factors as accident and injury 
rates, and compensation cost. It is a challenge to measure these factors because they are reactive 
(e.g., after the event) and they are infrequent (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). The focus on safety 
results means that the success of safety is measured by lower levels of system failure (Cohen, 
2002). Thus, safety climate research is intended to be a more proactive measure of safety 
performance (Strickoff, 2000). Unfortunately, there are limited publications that have established 
a clear link between safety climate and safety behavior. The relationship between safety climate 
and safety behavior has mostly been inferred from structural equation models based on a variety 
of self-reported instruments. This is a reflection of two things: there may be no predictive links 
between safety climate and safety behavior, or the relationship between safety climate and safety 
behaviors can be found if behavioral measurements are measured over a longer period of time 
(Cooper & Phillips, 2004). The struggle to link safety climate and safety behavior using these 
other assessment methods has caused safety climate researchers to consider broader factors of 
safety climate such as organizational climate (Wallace et al., 2006). 
 Recently, safety climate researchers have begun examining organizational based 
processes and perceptions, which are thought to impact the tendency to be involved in accidents 
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000; 2002). Climate refers to the shared perceptions among 
members of an organization with regard to policies, procedures, and practices (Ostroff, Kinicki, 
& Tamkins, 2003). In other words, climate is an experientially based description of what people 
see and report happening to them in an organizational setting. Therefore, an understanding of 
climate is important in assessing organizational effects on employee behaviors. This is because 
employees do not directly respond to the work environment; they first perceive and interpret the 
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work environment and then act according to their interpretations (Campbell et al., 1970; Carr, 
Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003). 
 Schneider and Bowen (1993), and Schneider, Bowen, Ehrhart, and Holcombe, (2000) 
have expanded the climate construct to represent two types: foundation and specific. Foundation 
climate refers to shared perceptions of a larger or more encompassing environment. Specific 
climate refers to those shared perceptions that are specific to a given area of interest (i.e., safety 
climate). They further suggest that while foundation climate does not correlate strongly with 
specific measures of outcomes, specific climate is more strongly related to a specific outcome 
(i.e., safety climate correlation with safety performance). For example, foundation climate (i.e., 
management-employee relations and organizational support) may predict safety climate. 
However, safety climate will have a stronger relationship with safety performance than will 
foundation climate (Wallace et al., 2006). Wallace et al., (2006) suggest that it is important to 
include both foundation and specific climates in capturing criteria of interest in climate research. 
This is due to the possible indirect effects of a foundation climate effect on outcomes (i.e., safety 
performance) by way of a specific climate. Unfortunately, limited research has examined both 
foundation and safety climates as a predictor of safety performance (Neal et al., 2000; Silva et 
al., 2004; Wallace et al., 2006; Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2004). Therefore, the significance of 
this theory has yet to be validated (Wallace et al., 2006).  
 These current studies on safety climate assessment methodologies have struggled or have 
yet to strengthen the predictive relationship between safety climate and safety behaviors. The 
struggle to find a predictive relationship between safety climate and safety behaviors may 
account for the slow reception of safety climate findings among practitioners. The lack of 
acceptance or application of these studies can be traced to two reasons. First, researchers have 
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not reached any agreement on safety climate assessment methods (Cox & Flin, 1998; Ostrom et 
al., 1993; Schneider, 2000; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Erev, 2007). Second, researchers have not 
provided practitioners with appropriate solutions to reduce unsafe behaviors (Prussia et al., 2003; 
NSC, 1999; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Zohar & Erev, 2007). The present study seeks to further 
understand the relationship between safety climate and safety decision-making, a facet of safety 
behaviors, and perhaps advance the understanding of unsafe practices in industry. 
2.4 Challenges to the Assessment Approaches to Safety Climate 
 
 Earlier studies of safety climate assessment focused primarily on environmental factors 
while later studies focused on the cognitive and psychological factors that affected safety 
performance in the workplace (Cooper, 1995; Cooper & Phillips, 1994 & 2004; Guldenmund, 
2000; Schneider, 2000). Cooper (1995), Cooper and Phillips (1994 & 2004), and Prussia et al. 
(2003) argue that researchers have been slow to reach a consensus on which of these factors, 
environmental or cognitive/psychological, are more influential. Furthermore, the separation of 
these factors has led to a proliferation of criteria and dimensions used to assess safety climate 
(Cox & Flin, 1998). This proliferation has made it difficult to develop a universal safety climate 
assessment methodology (Guldenmund, 2000; Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997). 
Cox and Flin (1998) demonstrated the negative effect that this wide range of dimensions 
has had on safety climate research. In their study, Cox and Flin (1998) showed how particular 
safety climate assessment methods were effectively used in one sector of an industry but failed to 
be effective in other industries. Further evidence of the failure to develop a universal safety 
climate assessment methodology was demonstrated in a study conducted by Coyle et al. (1995). 
The study (Coyle et al., 1995) used a previously identified assessment methodology in a similar 
kind of industry but failed to yield the same results. From these examples, it could be argued that 
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the lack of a universal assessment methodology is a sign that this research area could still be at 
its beginning stage (Guldenmund, 2000; Williamson et al., 1997). Since this research area is 
viewed as new, practitioners have yet to see the practicality of the research (Ostrom et al., 1993; 
Schneider, 2000; Zohar & Erev, 2007). 
From the review of these current struggles in safety climate research, it is apparent that 
there is a need for a recognized and accepted set of criteria and dimensions to measure and assess 
safety climate. This study argues that a systematic approach for selecting dimensions for safety 
climate should be based on commonly acceptable criteria (e.g., type of industry, type of 
organization). This approach could lay the foundation for developing a universal safety climate 
assessment methodology. 
2.5 Universal Criteria and Dimensions for Safety Climate Assessment 
Methodology 
 
Flin et al., (2000) and Guldenmund (2000) identified that the following themes have been 
emphasized consistently in the majority of studies over the past four and a half decades: 
• Management commitment, 
• Functionality of organizational safety system, 
• Work pressure, 
• Employees’ competencies, and 
• Policy and procedures. 
Flin et al. (2000) suggest that these five principal themes are vital when measuring 
employees’ perceptions on management attitudes and behaviors with respect to the relationship 
between the priorities of safety and productivity. The present study agrees with Flin et al. (2000) 
and believes that these themes are relevant to finding a systematic approach for selecting 
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dimensions based on commonly accepted criteria. For this reason, this study examines the 
themes (management commitment, approach to safety systems, work pressure, employees’ 
competencies, policy and procedures) in further detail below. 
2.5.1 Management Commitment  
 
Flin et al. (2000) argue that management commitment is a prime theme worthy of 
measurement. This theme relates to the worksite safety climate and other issues such as 
selection, discipline, and planning. Management commitment appears explicitly (e.g., with a 
dimension label) in more than 13 reviewed studies and implicitly (from inspecting the items) in 
over 18 reviewed studies (Flin et al., 2000). However, Clarke (1999) argues that using the label 
implicitly makes it difficult to discern the level of management being assessed (e.g., supervisors, 
senior managers/plant managers). This is not a trivial point because these levels of management 
have distinct roles and are perceived differently by the workforce (Clarke, 1999; Zohar, 2002; 
Zohar & Luria, 2003; Zohar & Erev, 2007). 
The role of the supervisor in safety management has long been recognized (Heinrich, 
1959, p. 22): 
“The supervisor or foreman is the key man in industrial accident prevention. His 
application of the art of supervision to control of worker performance is the factor of 
greatest influence in successful accident prevention.” 
Studies on supervisor behaviors and leadership styles have correlated with critical safety 
behaviors (Fleishman, 1953; Mearns, Flin, Fleming, & Gordon, 1997; Simard & Marchand, 
1995; Zohar & Luria, 2003), which have led to increase assessment of this aspect of 
management. Likewise, the examination of upper management behaviors and leadership styles 
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can increase overall assessment of management’s influence on safety behaviors (Flin et al., 
2000). 
2.5.2 Functionality of Organizational Safety System 
 
Senior management’s influence on workforce perceptions and safety performances was 
of greater interest 20 years ago, when leadership research was more popular (Guldenmund, 
2000). For example, there were several studies that investigated the relationship between 
managers’ beliefs and leadership styles and accident rates on their sites (Andriessen, 1978; 
Eyssen, Hoffmann, & Spengler, 1980). Unfortunately, these studies did not identify the 
processes relating to upper management behaviors and the resulting impact on safety behaviors 
(Flin et al., 2000). Thompson et al. (1998) stated that while senior managers affect the overall 
safety system of their organization (e.g., set the tone for the organizational atmosphere, establish 
priorities, and allocate resources) there is very little evidence that shows how this affects 
workforce safety performance. 
Functionality of organizational safety system is the second most identified theme in 
almost every survey (Flin et al., 2000). The perception of the functionality of the organizational 
safety system encompasses many different aspects of the organization’s safety management 
system. This perception includes safety officials and safety committees’ level of authority, 
permit to work systems, adequate safety equipment, safety policies/procedures, 
reward/recognition program, and the balance between production and safety (Flin et al., 2000). 
The functionality of the organizational safety system is measured based on three criteria of safety 
climate (Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003): 
• The effects of supervisory style on the level of concern for safety among 
subordinates, 
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• Supervisory attitudes and practices toward safety that lead to safety climate within 
the organization, and 
• Safety priority dictated by upper management and its effects on supervisory safety 
practices and leadership styles. 
According to these three assessment criteria the key component of the functionality of the 
organizational safety system is based on the role of supervisors. As stated by Zohar and Luria 
(2003, p. 4), 
“If supervisors repeatedly make safety procedures contingent on production pressure, 
workers will infer low safety priority even if management’s overt policy is that safety has 
top priority…If merit bonuses are awarded to workers who are not known for their safety, 
other workers will infer low safety priority despite formal declarations to the contrary.” 
Supervisors’ effects on workers’ perceptions of the functionality of the organizational safety 
system are further evident in a study conducted by Zohar and Erev (2007); their study 
demonstrated that safety behaviors depend largely on external supervisory contingencies (e.g., 
rewards and work pressures) rather than internal self-preservation considerations. 
2.5.3 Work Pressure 
 
Work pressure is job demands and stress in the work environment that exceeds the skills 
and abilities of an employee (Guldenmund, 2000). When the skill and abilities of a worker is 
exceeded this contributes to work overload, role ambiguity, and conflicting role demands. For 
this reason, work pressure is recognized as a vital element of a safety climate (Advisory 
Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations [ACSNI], 1993; Falbruch & Wilpert, 1999). Work 
pressure related to safety has been thought to be primarily a function of management (e.g., line 
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supervisors, plant managers, etc.) attitudes and practices of maintaining balance between 
productivity and safety (Flin et al., 2000). 
However, recent studies have also identified that peer-pressure (i.e., team pressure to 
meet production goals) along with pressure from upper management, is a determining factor in 
establishing perceived work pressure (Havold, 2005; Michael, Evans, Jansen, & Haight, 2005). 
The combination of these two determinant factors creates the overall workforce perception of the 
balance maintained between productivity and safety. This notion is evident in a study conducted 
by Dedobbeleer and Beland (1998), which demonstrated that the tendency of workers to take 
risks or ignore procedures was highly correlated to their perception of working in a high stress 
environment. Another factor associated with the tendency to take risks is the competency of the 
workforce. A worker with low competency (e.g., qualifications, skills and knowledge) for the job 
function is more likely to take risks because of peer pressure (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Flin et 
al., 2000; Flin & O’Connor, 2000). 
2.5.4 Competence 
 
Competence is workers’ perceptions of the level of qualifications, skills and knowledge 
possessed by both co-workers and management (Guldenmund, 2000). This perception is highly 
correlated to management practices such as selection, training, and assessment of competence 
standards (Flin et al., 2000). These management practices are likely influenced by broader 
economic conditions, such as the labor market and training budgets (Flin et al., 2000; Flin & 
O’Connor, 2000; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). In turn, these economic conditions affect the 
adoption of specific maintenance policies and procedures (e.g., educational requirements, 
assessment of competence standards) within an organization (Bax, Steijn, & De Witte, 1998; 
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Guldenmund, 2000; Hudson, Van der Graaf, & Verschuur, 1998; McDonald, 1998; Reason, 
Parker, & Lawton, 1998). 
2.5.5 Policies and Procedures 
 
Policies and procedures are the most frequently recurring theme in safety climate 
assessment methodology studies (Guldenmund, 2000). The concept of policies and procedures 
deals with communications concerning accessible safety information, attitudes toward safety 
rules, and compliance with and enforcement of the policies and procedures. The defiance of 
these communications has been correlated with risk-taking behaviors (Bax et al., 1998; Hudson 
et al., 1998; Lee, 1998; McDonald, 1998; Reason et al., 1998). Lee (1998) conducted a study that 
showed that failure to enforce policies and procedures correlates with risk-taking behaviors, and 
is highly connected with accident involvement in the workplace. These studies suggest that 
policies and procedures need to be included in safety climate factors. 
Although these five themes (e.g., management commitment, functionality of 
organizational safety system, work pressure, competencies, policy and procedures) are identified 
as consistent dimensions in safety climate assessment methodology, there is still a need to 
develop a universal safety assessment methodology (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). 
2.6 Assessment Methodology 
 
Currently, the only universally accepted approach to safety climate assessment is through 
an analysis of self-administered questionnaires (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). The 
development of a self-administered questionnaire utilizes the following process (Guldenmund, 
2000): 
1) Set up bounds for the particular area of interest, 
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2) Identify aspects relevant to the area of interest with a major focus on beliefs, 
perceptions, and attitudes, 
3) Formulate a questionnaire, 
4) Pre-test the questionnaire in a pilot study on a relevant population, and  
5) Analyze the data. 
Once a questionnaire has been developed, following these five processes, the data is 
collected and analyzed, based on the expected relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables (i.e., linearity); several typical methods of analysis are (Guldenmund, 2000): 
• Factor Analysis (FA), 
•  Principle Component Analysis (PCA), 
•  Homogeneity Analysis (HOMALS), 
• Non-linear principal components analysis (PRINCALS), 
• Smallest Space Analysis (SSA), and 
•  Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) 
Unfortunately, despite the logic of using an assessment methodology for safety climate, the 
literature review reveals that these methods are rarely utilized in industry (Cox & Flin, 1998; 
Coyle el al., 1995; Guldenmund, 2000; Williamson et al., 1997; Zohar, 2000). 
The review of existing literature shows the struggles and attempts that safety climate 
researchers had both defining and reaching universal assessment methodology. Although 
careless behaviors still remain in industry (NSC, 1999), a methodology to assess safety climate 
and its usefulness has yet to gain industry wide acceptance. Researchers have yet to tie together 
the knowledge about safety climate and safety behaviors into best managerial practices to reduce 
unsafe behaviors in the workplace (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; DeJoy, 1994 & 2005; Prussia et al., 
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2003; Ostrom et al., 1993; Smith et al. 2006; Zohar & Erev, 2007). This study argues that safety 
climate researchers have yet to solidify the decision-making processes (cognitive and 
psychological implications) that cause human decision behaviors to deviate from that predicted 
by normative models. 
2.7 Decision-making 
 
Buchanan and O’Connell (2006) claimed that decision-making has been an area of 
interest to humankind since the fourth century, since Aristotle argued that in order to understand 
choice, useful knowledge gained through sensing and deductive reasoning should be important. 
This interest in choice lies in the fact that human beings are continuously engaged in decision-
making processes that are made up of a variety of facets. Decision-making, a process that is 
guided by a set of rules, involves acquiring and weighing accessible information in order to 
select the “best” alternative (Mintz, 1993; Mintz & Geva, 1997; Mintz et al., 1997; Simon, 
1955). Decision rules, theories, and models have been developed to predict, quantify, and 
measure people’s decision-making processes. 
Decision-making theories and models that address the cognitive and behavioral processes 
study the way people process and organize information and arrive at judgments or conclusions 
based on their observations of situations (Steers, 1988). Cognitive style reflects “how,” rather 
than “how well” people perceive and judge information (Hough & Ogilvie, 2005). 
2.7.1 Behavioral Decision-Making  
 
Four decades ago, Edwards (1954) provided a major review for psychologists concerning 
research by economists, statisticians, and philosophers on decision behaviors. He argued that 
normative and predictive decision models should be important to psychologists who are 
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interested in judgment and choice. Simon (1955) further argued that in order to understand 
judgment and choice (e.g., decision behaviors), research should focus on perceptual, cognitive, 
and learning factors. These factors explain why human decision behaviors deviate from those 
predicted by normative models. He also stated that the limited computational capabilities of 
decision-makers, influenced by the complexity of task environments, create bounded rationality 
(e.g., decision behaviors that may suggest or reflect limited information processing). Later, 
Simon (1978) stated that actual decision behaviors might not estimate the behaviors predicted by 
normative models of decision tasks. 
 Four decades later, a clear and separate area of inquiry emerged, which is referred to as 
Behavioral Decision Research (BDR). BDR, an interdisciplinary area of study, employs concepts 
and models from economics, social and cognitive psychology and statistics (Payne et al., 1992). 
It is unique among sub-disciplines in psychology, because it tests the descriptive adequacy of 
normative theories of judgment and choice. By doing so, it makes substantial use of 
psychological concepts in general and cognitive method in particular. 
There is a growing focus on the problem structuring and learning elements of decision 
behavior, although the amount of such research is still small (Payne et al., 1992). Examples 
include research on alternative generation (Gettys, Pliske, Manning, & Casey, 1987; Keller & 
Ho, 1988) and studies of how cues for inference are learned from outcome feedback (Klayman, 
1988). The richness of methods and problem descriptions used in decision research continues to 
increase. For example, process-tracing techniques, case methods, computer-game simulations, 
and even the presentation of data via radar screens are being used (Brehmer, 1990; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989; Lusk & Hammond, 1991). 
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 Because this review is selective rather than exhaustive, there will only be a review of the 
major trends (constructive nature of judgment and choice, and decision processing theories and 
models) and applications of recent BDR. For a more in-depth review on BDR that covers a 
longer time span and alternative perspectives please see the following literature: Abelson & Levi, 
1985; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988; Stevenson, Busemeyer, & Naylor, 1990. 
2.7.1.1 The Constructive Nature of Preferences and Beliefs 
 
An underlying theme of BDR is preferences “for” and beliefs “about” the complexity of 
an event, that are constructed by people and not revealed in response to a judgment or choice 
(Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990). The idea of constructive preferences is more than observed 
preferences which result from reference to a master list in the memory. Constructive preferences 
also mean that preferences are not necessarily generated by some consistent and invariant 
algorithm such as expected value calculation (Tversky, Sattath, & Solvic, 1988). 
 March (1978) attributes constructive preferences to the same limits on information 
processing capacity that is emphasized by Simon (1955). In his words, “Human beings have 
unstable, inconsistent, incompletely evoked, and imprecise goals at least in part because human 
abilities limit preference orderliness” (March, 1978, p. 598). March’s argument about 
preferences applies to belief judgments as well, and the constructive view as a major organizing 
theme. It appears that decision-makers have a range of strategies for identifying their preferences 
and developing their beliefs. These strategies result from both experience and training (Fong, 
Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Kruglanski, 1989; Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990). 
Descriptive research on decision-making has shown that information acquisition and 
strategies used to construct preferences or beliefs are contingent upon a variety of task, context, 
and individual-difference factors (Payne et al., 1992). Task factors are general characteristics of a 
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decision problem, such as response mode (e.g., judgment or choice), which is not dependent 
upon the values (e.g., context factors) of the alternatives (Payne et al., 1992). Context factors, 
such as similarity of alternatives, are associated with the particular values of the alternatives. 
Task and context factors cause different aspects of the problem to be significant and to evoke 
different processes for combining information. Thus, characteristics of the decision problem, 
such as the response mode or similarity, can evoke different strategies that determine preferences 
and beliefs. Further, the characteristics to which people are sensitive often come from a 
normative perspective, although this is not always relevant (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; 
Tversky et al., 1988). Consequently, people sometimes ignore normatively relevant information. 
Hence, an important component of current decision research is the identification of task 
conditions that can determine whether normative information will be used (Gigerenzer, Hell, & 
Blank, 1988; Ginossar & Trope, 1987). 
Also, related to the constructive nature of decision behaviors are the conflicting meta-
goals adopted for the decision sequence (i.e., maximize accuracy or justifiability, minimize 
effort, regret, or conflict) (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Tetlock, 1985). Meta-goals are functions of 
individual difference-factors such as processing capacities and prior knowledge or expertise 
(Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990; Shanteau, 1988). Another important ongoing issue is the 
extent to which individual differences in values and beliefs are related across task and context 
changes (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; Schoemaker, 1990). Thus, many current issues in 
BDR can be related to the notion of the constructive nature of human preferences and beliefs and 
the use of multiple approaches for solving decision problems. These themes show the 
fundamental elements of BDR (e.g., preferences and beliefs) and multiple strategies aimed at 
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improving decision-making processes (e.g., cognitive and psychological aspects) (Russo, 1977; 
Simon, 1955; Viscusi, Magat, & Huber, 1986). 
2.7.1.2 Application of Behavioral Decision Research (BDR) 
 
BDR is often motivated by the desire to improve decision-making processes (Russo, 
1977; Simon, 1955; Viscusi et al., 1986); several approaches to improving decision processes 
have been identified in the literature (Clemen, 1996; Keeney, 1982; Kirkwood, 1997; Payne et 
al., 1992; Pratt, Raiffa, & Schlaifer, 1964;). Some researchers emphasize the need for changes in 
the task environment facing the decision-maker (Payne et al., 1992). For example, because BDR 
is descriptively variant (e.g., information presentation), it suggests that decisions might be 
improved through straightforward and imperceptible changes to the information with which 
individuals make judgments and choices. 
Other approaches (e.g., decision analysis) emphasize improving the information-
processing abilities of decision-makers for dealing with decision tasks (Clemen, 1996; Keeney, 
1982; Kirkwood, 1997; Pratt, Raiffa, & Schlaifer, 1964). Improving the information-processing 
abilities requires task reconstruction to make judgments and choices easier for the decision-
maker (Henrion, Fischer, & Mullin, 1993; MacGregor, Lichtenstein, & Slovic, 1988; Ravinder, 
Kleinmuntz, & Dyer, 1988). However, decision analysts also try to improve the abilities of 
decision-makers to cope with complex tasks. This is accomplished through the provision of 
decision aids (e.g., computer-based decision support systems) and training in statistical and 
decision-theoretical reasoning (Payne et al., 1992). The combination of task reconstruction, 
decision aids, and training can possibly improve information processing abilities. The 
combination of these decision aids can be thought of as methods for improving the match 
between the task and the person’s strategic decision-making abilities. Thus, to further advance 
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the field of BDR, there needs to be more studies on strategic decision-making (e.g., perception, 
communication, cognitive and environmental factors) (Payne et al., 1992). However, people are 
more complex than manifested by their observable decisions and behaviors. Therefore, BDR 
does not provide a reliable portrayal of an individual’s complete makeup (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). 
Furthermore, both practitioners (managers) and researchers are interested in the process 
of strategic decision-making and improving the quality of those decisions (Hough & Ogilvie, 
2005). As Stubbart (1989) states, most strategy researchers do not accept the “think alike” notion 
of economic man; instead, they believe that strategy is intentional. There are individual 
differences in how individuals perceive, acquire, interpret, and use information (Walsh, 1995). 
Hough and Ogilvie (2005) conducted a resource-based review of strategy, which revealed that 
these differences are important. Their review showed that how individuals perceive, acquire, 
interpret, and use information lead to differences in organizational capabilities and performance 
inconsistencies. Sadler-Smith (1998) states that since cognitive style can affect workers’ choice 
and behaviors, it is essential that researchers examine this further. 
2.7.2 Cognitive Style 
 
Messick (1976) defined cognitive style as individual differences in preferred ways of 
organizing and processing information and experience. Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, and Cox 
(1977) state that cognitive style is an individual difference in how people perceive, think, solve 
problems, learn, and relate to each other. They further explain that the way in which people 
process, organize information, and arrive at judgments or conclusions based on their 
observations of situations. Hough & Ogilvie, (2005) stated that, cognitive style reflects “how,” 
rather than “how well,” people perceive and judge information. Thus, cognitive styles are 
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processes that emphasize individual traits rather than cognitive ability; it focuses on preferred 
styles rather than which is better. Thus, another area of cognitive research that is relevant to this 
study in understanding rules, theories, and models of decision-making processes. 
2.7.3 Process Characteristics of Decision-Making 
 
A decision task typically consists of the selection of an alternative from a set of options. 
Rational decision-making is a process by which a set of options is identified, as well as a set of 
dimensions (efficiency, reputation, safety, etc.) employed to evaluate the alternatives. Weights 
are then assigned to each dimension; and subsequently, the alternatives are ranked based on the 
evaluation along all dimensions. Finally, the alternative with the highest weight is expected to be 
selected. 
There are five fundamental processing characteristics of decision-making (Billings & 
Sherer, 1988; Ford et al., 1989; Keren, Freeman, & Schwab, 2006; Mintz & Geva, 1997; Mintz 
et al., 1997; Schoemaker, 1980; Sage, 1990), which are relevant to this study: holistic vs. 
nonholistic decision-making, alternative-based vs. dimension-based decision-making, satisfying 
vs. optimizing decision principles, risk oriented information acquisition vs. non-risk oriented 
information acquisition, and choice. 
  Holistic vs. nonholistic decision-making (Schoemaker, 1980): holistic decision-making is 
a thorough examination of all available alternatives. This is followed by an exhaustive 
comparison of the alternatives (and their implications) against each other across the decision 
dimensions. Nonholistic decision-making is a simplified process whereby the decision maker 
sequentially disregards or selects alternatives (Sage, 1990) “by comparing them to each other, or 
against a standard, either across dimensions or across alternatives (p. 233).” The cognitive load 
in holistic decision-making is demanding, while cognitive load in nonholistic decision-making 
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are streamlined by heuristics (simple, efficient rules by evolutionary processes or learned, which 
explain how people make decisions) that introduce cognitive shortcuts (Sage, 1990). 
Alternative-based vs. dimension-based decision-making (Ford et al., 1989): Alternative-
based decision-making processing involves the sequential consideration of alternatives. In an 
alternative-based process, decision makers consider all the implications of an alternative before 
considering a second alternative. In contrast, in a dimension-based process, decision makers 
compare several alternatives against one dimension before considering a second dimension. 
Decision-making oriented around alternatives is a process whereby all alternatives and 
dimensions are considered with a pattern oriented toward alternative-based decision-making; In 
contrast, decision-making oriented around dimension-based is a process whereby alternatives 
and dimensions are considered with a pattern oriented towards dimension-based decision-making 
(Mintz et al., 1997). 
Safety oriented vs. non-safety oriented information acquisition: In a safety-oriented 
information acquisition process, safety is a significant dimension. Thus, it is expected that during 
a safety-oriented information acquisition process, decision makers will intensively review all the 
implications of safety against a set of alternatives. In contrast, in a non-safety-oriented 
information acquisition process, safety is not a significant dimension. Thus, it is expected that 
during a non-safety-oriented information acquisition process, decision makers will not 
intensively review all the implications of safety against a set of alternatives 
2.7.4 Strategy Selection 
 
Beach and Mitchell, (1978) explain that strategy selection is contingent upon 
characteristics of both the decision task and the individual decision-maker. There are some 
characteristics which are inherent in the decision problem, which affects strategy selection. For 
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instance, the uncertainty of the task, the amount of relevant information, and the influence of 
future decisions, will affect strategy selection (Billings & Scherer, 1988). Ford et al. (1989) 
suggest time and pressure also influence strategy selection since imposed time constraints may 
affect the format of the information (e.g., exclude some strategies from consideration). 
Moreover, strategy selection is also influenced by changes in the format in which the 
information is presented to decision-makers. Hey and Paradiso (2006) showed how people’s 
evaluation of the same problems differs in respect to their temporal format. Rahn, Aldrich, and 
Borgida (1994) gave further evidence to the influence of formatting. They examined the 
importance of individual and contextual variations in information-processing strategies for 
candidate evaluation. The results of their study showed that differences in presentation format 
play a critical role in candidate appraisal. 
Other influential factors in strategy selection were illustrated by Stone and Schkade 
(1991). They noted that decision-makers resort to an alternative-based information search and 
less to compensatory processing, when the values (utilities) associated with alternatives are given 
in words rather than in numbers. Furthermore, Gilliland, Wood, and Schmitt (1994) conducted 
another study that found strategy selection was affected by the labeling or non-labeling of 
alternatives. Their study showed that the labeling of alternatives may facilitate the recollection of 
information relevant to the decision. This may also cause decision-makers to avoid unfamiliar 
information. Also, when provided with labels, decision-makers may also employ simplified 
decision models, because it may appear to them that not all alternatives may need to be accessed 
or searched. 
When information search patterns are compared among scenarios containing familiar and 
unfamiliar alternatives, a dimension-based pattern is characteristic of the unfamiliar (and 
 29
therefore more cognitively demanding) scenarios, whereas an alternative-based search is more 
common in familiar choice sets (Mintz et al., 1997). Mintz et al. (1997) and Tetlock (1992) also 
show that accountability affects strategy and choice. Decision-makers who must justify their 
decisions invest more effort in acquiring and retaining information than those who do not have to 
be stressed over such situations. 
Maoz (1997) found a significant relationship between levels of stress and the selection of 
three particular decision strategies (e.g., analytic, cybernetic, or cognitive). The analytic 
approach characterizes decision-making at moderate stress levels. The cybernetic approach tends 
to be associated with low stress; the cognitive approach is often found at high levels of stress. 
Lastly, Suedfeld, Wallace, and Thachuk (1993) argue that leaders, as “cognitive managers,” 
ultimately need to weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages of differing levels of 
complexity in choosing the kind of strategy that they adapt. This will be obvious in the reflection 
of their choices. 
2.7.4.1 Effect of Strategy Selection on Choice 
 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1988) stated that the selection of a particular strategy 
affects the ultimate choice. Thus, it is expected that judgment and choice outcomes will differ 
based on the type of strategy used. For instance, Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2003) 
conducted a study on decision-making where decision-makers favored short-term over long-term 
consequences of actions. Short-term consequences of action were defined as impulsive or 
temporally intolerant. This relates to individual differences in the decision-making functions of 
working memory, which affected preference (alternative or attribute) and choice outcomes. 
Ford et al. (1989) stated that choices by alternative and dimensions are different. 
Similarly, choices based on a compensatory strategy are very different from those made under 
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non-compensatory rules. Often the strategy selection and choice are based on accessibility to 
vital information. 
Sharps and Martin (2002) conducted research where they demonstrated that people often 
make decisions without reference to vital information, even when such information is readily 
available. This tendency originates from a failure to have pertinent information immediately 
available in the decision context. Thus, the presentation of pertinent information in immediate 
decision contexts, even information available in long-term memory, can improve understanding 
of decision situations and reduce “mindless” decision processes. Another area of research that is 
vital to referencing important information is the state of mind or mood of individuals 
(Jonas, Graupmann, & Frey, 2006; Nabi, 2003). 
Jonas et al. (2006) conducted a study on the interplay between dissonance theory and 
mood regulation approach. They examined how individuals search for information after making 
a decision while under the influence of positive versus negative mood. Dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957) is based on two factors: 
1) Cost incurrence will increase the decision maker’s perceived value of choice or 
outcomes, and 
2) Individuals are motivated to reduce a negative state and engage in dissonance-
reducing strategies to accomplish cognitive consonance (harmony). 
 Jonas et al. (2006) suggested that negative moods increase the preference for consonant 
(consistent) over dissonant (variance) information during decision-making. They showed that a 
positive mood leads to a more balanced information search by decision-makers. Thus, people’s 
emotional state will determine their preference, value, strategy selection, and choice whether the 
problem is consonant or dissonant (Jonas et al. 2006; Simonson, 1989). 
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The selective nature of this literature review on decision-making illustrates the extensive 
research studies on decision rule theories and models, some of which are not covered by this 
study. The relevant literature on decision-making offers a framework from which to correlate 
safety climate with safety decision-making. Thus, several of these fundamental models and 
theories will be incorporated into this study. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In order to examine the relationship between the strength of a safety climate and the 
orientation towards safety in a decision-making processes and choices, questionnaire and 
decision scenarios were used in this study. Through these methods, this study hopes to answer 
the following questions: Can the strength of a safety climate predict safer decision-making 
process and choice? 
Both the questionnaire and decision scenarios methods were administered through the 
web. The study was conducted in a manufacturing facility in Iowa. It included 111 of the 186 
employees in the facility. 
3.2 Instruments 
 
The intended research study proposes to investigate the relationship between safety 
climate and safety decision-making through the utilization of two instruments: 
• Safety climate survey, were developed and distributed to employees in a 
manufacturing environment. Variety of indices was used to quantitatively 
correlate between strength of safety climate and safety decision-making. 
• Decision Mind software, a web based decision-making simulation program was 
utilized to capture decision-making processes and choices among participants. 
Participants were asked to work on the simulation following completion of the 
safety climate survey. 
 
 33
3.2.1 Safety Climate Survey 
 
A survey was constructed to measure key areas of safety climate. The first step in 
developing this survey was to identify primary areas of interest in this research. These areas were 
determined from a meta-analytic review of consistent themes in prior safety climates studies 
(Guldenmund, 2000; Flin et al., 2000). These themes are: 
• Management commitment to safety, 
• Functionality of organizational safety system, 
• Peer pressure/work pressure, 
• Employees’ competencies, and  
• Communication/ Policy and procedures 
Flin et al. (2000) suggest that these themes are vital when measuring employees’ perceptions of 
management attitudes and behaviors with respect to safety and productivity. Thus, these five 
themes were used as a foundational point in developing the areas of interest of this study. 
The safety climate survey was developed to measure employees’ beliefs, perceptions, 
training, previous experience, and attitudes. Through a review of 29 safety climate surveys, over 
400 statements/questions were generated (Berends, 1996; Brown & Homles, 1986; Cabrera, Isla, 
& Vilela, 1997; Carr et al., 2003; Cooper, 1995; Cooper & Phillips, 1994; Coyle et al., 1995; 
Cox & Cox,1991; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; DeJoy, Schafferb, Wilson, Vandenberg, & 
Butts, 2004; Flin et al., 2000; Geller, 1994; Glennon,1982a, & 1982b; Lee, 1996; Havold, 2005; 
Michael et al. 2005; Niskanen, 1994; Olive, O’Connor, & Mannan, 2006; Ostrom et al., 1993; 
Safety Research Unit, 1993; Seo Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004; Sheron, Shotkin, & Baratta, 1993; 
Williamson et al., 1997; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2003). These statements/questions were 
reduced by half, by first controlling for recurring and parallel statements/questions (i.e., those 
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conveying the same meaning). These statements/questions were further reduced by controlling 
for personal identifiers (e.g., gender, age, and other demographics). This step was taken in order 
to maintain anonymity among the participants. Maintaining anonymity is a key component to 
evoking honest responses from participants. Jordan and Lundin’s (2002) study on workplace 
conflict revealed that participants view anonymity as a great advantage when expressing their 
true and personal feelings. Once all personal identifiers were eliminated, the goal was to select 
statements that measured areas of interest within this research. These statements were then 
categorized into seven areas of interest. 
A questionnaire of 33 statements was created. It was organized by the following areas of 
interest of this study: 
• Management commitment to safety: Seven statements addressing management’s 
commitment to safety as reflected in the balance of safety over productivity, 
• Communication of safety expectations/goals: Four statements addressing 
communication about safety expectations, goals, and performance of employees, 
• The Functionality of organizational safety: Eight statements addressing safety 
personnel’s authority and availability, accident investigation, safety performance 
feedback and evaluation, and enforcement issues, 
• Physical Working Environment: Four statements addressing the physical 
condition of the work environment, 
• Compliance with Procedures: Five statements addressing the relationships 
among co-workers, and 
• Competence: Five statements addressing transfer of learning from safety training, 
and management/supervisors’ familiarity with safety requirements. 
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A seventh dimension was created following the factorial analysis of the survey data (see 
Appendix A). This was done because the analysis of the survey data showed that two statements 
did not correlate with dimension three, functionality of organizational safety. This new 
dimension was presented as follows: 
• Safety Performance: Two statements addressing safety performance feedback 
and its effects on promotion. 
In order to measure the perception of these dimensions, a variation of the 5-point Likert 
scale was used (Latham, 2006). A Likert scale is a psychometric response scale widely used in 
survey research. When responding to a Likert questionnaire item, participants specify their level 
of agreement with a statement/question. Thus, the statements in this study were arranged on a 5-
point Likert scale. Responses range from strongly disagree (a value of one) to strongly agree (a 
value of five). All the statements were constructed with positive valence (i.e., the higher the 
rating the more favorable the response). The statements are listed below in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Safety Climate Dimensions and Statements 
Management Commitment 
Managers are committed to safety. 
Safety is given priority over productivity. 
Managers are always examples of appropriate safety procedures. 
Work will not begin until we are properly staffed to perform work safely. 
Exemplary safety performance is recognized/awarded. 
Employees are authorized to stop work process if hazards arise. 
Reports of safety concerns are addressed appropriately. 
 
Communication of safety expectations/goals 
Company safety performance is widely communicated.  
Management clearly defines/emphasize safety performance expectations/goals. 
Top management is receptive when middle management expresses their concerns with maintaining 
appropriate safety level. 
Supervisors are always receptive to reports of safety concerns. 
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Table 3.1 Safety Climate Dimensions and Statements (Contd). 
 
The Functionality of organizational safety 
Safety personnel are authorized to stop production in case of a safety concern. 
Safety personnel are available in a timely manner to address safety concerns. 
Accidents are thoroughly investigated  
Accident investigation recommendations are implemented in a timely manner. 
Safety staff enforces safe working practices on employees. 
Safety staff enforces safe working practices on managers. 
 
Safety Performance 
I receive safety performance feedback during my employee evaluation. 
Personnel safety record play role in evaluation for promotion process.  
 
Physical Working Environment 
Working conditions (noise, temperature, lighting, required work posture, etc.) are comfortable. 
Safety concerns (electrical faults, broken ladder, spills etc.) are repaired in a timely manner. 
Tools/equipments are adequate to perform my job safely.  
We are required to keep our work areas clean and in order. 
 
Compliance with procedures 
We do not take safety shortcuts at work (not following safety procedures). 
Supervisors encourage us to report co-workers who take safety shortcuts. 
My co-workers will not ask me to take shortcuts. 
My relationship with my co-workers will NOT be affected if I refuse to take safety shortcuts 
My co-workers will report my behavior if I take a safety shortcut. 
 
Competence 
The knowledge I gained from safety training helps me to perform my work safely. 
Policies and procedures strongly emphasize safe working practices.  
Supervisors are familiar with safety requirements specified in the policies/procedures. 
I can easily understand safety documents and their meaning. 
My co-workers are familiar with safety requirements specified in the policies/procedures. 
 
 
This questionnaire was reviewed and approved by the Iowa State University’s 
Institutional Review Board (see Appendix B). The questionnaire was administered to the 
participants through the use of a web-base program, Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com). 
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The questionnaire provided the background upon which inferences can be made about 
participants’ decision-making processes and choices. 
3.2.2 Decision-Making Simulation 
 
Process tracing is a methodology designed to identify the information accessed and the 
order in which the information is viewed during a decision-making process. The data gathered 
from process tracing can be used to make inferences about which decision strategies were 
employed en route to a choice (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). In this study, the Decision 
MindTM, software used to simulate decision-making, was utilized to facilitate decision process 
tracing. 
The Decision MindTM simulator facilitates decision process tracing. The computerized 
Decision Mind TM software records key features of a decision-making process, such as: the 
sequence in which participants acquire information, the number of items that participants viewed 
for every alternative along each dimension, the time period from the start of the decision task 
until the participants make a choice, and the participants’ final choice. The Decision MindTM 
simulator then displays the “decision portraits” of each participant. In addition, the Decision 
MindTM simulator calculates indices about the information search for each of the key features of 
a decision-making process described above (Mintz, 2004, 2005). Information search indices are 
new features that use information collected by Decision MindTM simulator. The categorization of 
these search indices are complied by the Decision MindTM, without numerical interpretations. 
Therefore, calculations for Dimension Search Indices are made separately. 
The core structure of the Decision MindTM simulator is a matrix of decision alternatives 
(Ai) and decision dimensions (Dj), as presented in Figure 3.1. The participants are introduced to 
the decision matrix electronically (web-based computer program). Participants are expected to 
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choose an alternative from a set of alternatives based on the information they acquire from the 
scenario in the Decision MindTM simulator. This information is acquired by “clicking” on 
information buttons Vij. The information available in Vij represents the evaluation of a given 
alternative (Ai) on a given dimension (Dj). Vij consists of a descriptive statement (e.g., 
implication of alternatives against each dimension and vice versa) and a numeric rating value (on 
a scale from -10 to +10). A lower numeric rating (less than zero) refers to a negative evaluation, 
and a high numeric rating (greater than zero) refers to a positive evaluation. The numeric values 
are intended to create a sense of scaled impact that an alternative will have on each dimension. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Decision MindMT Simulator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A1 A2 An
D1 
D2 
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The Decision Mind simulator records key features from the decision-making process of 
each participant: 
• The sequence in which participants acquire information, 
• The number of items viewed by participants, for every alternative along each 
dimension, 
• The time period from the start of the decision task until the participants make a 
choice, and 
• The final choice of each participant. 
3.2.2.1 Decision Scenario 
 
The majority of industrial operations are documented in Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP). SOPs provide detailed guidelines for most industrial operations. Failure to follow SOPs 
(taking a “short cut”) has been linked to injuries and accidents in the workplace (NSC, 1999). 
For this reason the focus of the decision scenario is on complying with SOPs. The text of the 
scenario was stated as follows: 
 You are employed by a steel manufacturing plant. During day to day routine 
activities one co-worker suggests taking a short cut in implementation for one of the 
standard operating procedures. Your decision will have implications in the 
following dimensions: 
 
• Peer Pressure, 
• Safety, 
• Productivity, and 
• Promotion. 
 
You have the following four alternatives:  
 
• Ignore: Just ignore the suggestion and continue with work; 
• Report without details: Disagree with the suggestion and report the event without 
mentioning names in the situation; 
• Agree: Agree with the suggested short cut; and 
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• Report with details: Disagree with the suggestion and report the event including 
names and situation. 
 
When you are ready, follow the steps below in order to initiate and complete the 
simulation: 
After reviewing the scenario, the participants engaged in an information acquisition 
process in order to make a choice. This process involved reviewing the descriptive statements 
and numeric ratings based on the scenario, as presented in Appendix C. 
 A key feature of the Decision MindTM Simulator is the descriptive statements and 
numeric ratings of the safety dimension. The descriptive statements are the evaluation of the 
alternatives across the dimensions. The text and numeric ratings in the information bins (Vij) 
were developed by a panel of safety experts. This was accomplished by following the Delphi 
guidelines (Armstrong, 2006). The Delphi method is a way of structuring a group 
communication process. This process is effective in allowing groups to deal with a complex 
problem (Linstone, Turoff, & Helmer, 2002). To accomplish this “structured communication” 
the following steps must occur: 
• Feedback on the information (knowledge) contributed by individuals, 
•  Evaluation of the group’s judgment, 
• Opportunities for individual revision, and 
• A degree of anonymity for the individual responses.  
Through this process a consensus was reached on the appropriate numeric ratings and text.  
Based on the interest of this study, the safety dimension was used as a reference for the 
rankings and evaluations of the alternatives. The best choice, according to normative decision 
models, is the alternative with the highest numeric rating. In this study the “best” alternative is 
the one with the most favorable rating on safety. The safety ratings for each alternative are 
presented in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Evaluations of Alternatives on the Safety Dimension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2.2 Search Indices 
 
  The search indices measure the number of times information bins are reviewed on a 
certain dimension, with respect to the average number of times information bins are reviewed 
along all other dimensions (Keren et al., 2006). In this study, the following four dimensions 
accounts for the search indices: Peer Pressure (Pres_SI), Safety (S_SI), Productivity (Prod_SI), 
and Promotion (Prom_SI). These indices are calculated as follows: 
 
∑−
=−
= 1
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Pressure
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n
NSIPres            (3-1) 
 
where 
NPressure represents the number of times Pressure information bins were  
  visited. 
 
Ni_Pres    represents the number of times information bins in other dimensions i  
  (besides Pressure) were visited. 
 
 n            represents the number of dimensions in the decision matrix. 
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N
SIS              (3-2) 
Alternatives Score on Safety 
Agree -8 
Just Ignore -6 
Report without details 4 
Report with details 10 
 42
where 
 NSafety   represents the number of times Safety information bins were visited. 
 
Ni_Safety represents the number of times information bins in other dimensions i  
             (besides Safety) were visited. 
 
 
∑−
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1
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1 n
i
Prodi
Production
N
n
NProm_SI              (3-3) 
 where 
NProductivity represents the number of times Productivity information bins were 
      visited. 
 
Ni_Prod       represents the number of times information bins in other dimensions i  
      (besides Productivity) were visited. 
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n
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where 
 NPromotion represents the number of times Promotion information bins were  
    visited. 
 
Ni_Prom     represents the number of times information bins in other dimensions i  
     (besides Promotion) were visited. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses. 
 
To address the relationship between the strength of safety climate and safety decision-
making, the following four hypotheses have been introduced: 
• Hypothesis A: The seven safety climate categories cannot predict safety oriented 
decision-making process. 
 
• Hypothesis B: The composite safety climate score cannot predict safety oriented 
decision-making process. 
 
• Hypothesis C: The seven safety climate categories cannot predict selection of a safer 
choice. 
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• Hypothesis D: The composite safety climate score cannot predict selection of a safer 
choice. 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used as a predictive model to test hypothesis A. Simple 
regression analysis was used as a predictive model to test hypothesis B. Multinomial regression 
analysis was used a predictive model to test hypothesis C and D. The predictive models for 
hypotheses A and C will use the same independent variables, and the predictive models for 
hypotheses B and D will use the same independent variable. 
3.4 Analysis 
 
Statistically, the test for the hypotheses will have the following forms: 
Hypothesis A: 
Ho: εβ += 0Y                    (3-5) 
HA: εβββ ++++= kk XXY ,...,110                   (3-6) 
Where Y is the dependent variable, (S_SI), k is the number of predictors, kXX ...1  are the set of 
predictors, kβββ ,...,, 10  are the regression coefficients, and ε  is the error term. 
Hypothesis B: 
Ho: εβ += 0Y                    (3-7) 
HA: εββ ++= 110 XY                    (3-8) 
Where Y is the dependent variable, S_SI, k is the number of predictors, 1X  is the predictor, 10,ββ  
are the regression coefficients, and ε  is the error term. 
Hypothesis C: 
 Ho: 
( )
( ) εβ +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=
0|4Pr
|Pr
X
X
Y
iYLog                                                          (3-9) 
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HA:  
( )
( ) εβββ ++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=
kk XXY
iYLog ,...,
|4Pr
|Pr
110X
X                 (3-10) 
Where ( )X|Pr iY =  are the odds of selecting choice igiven the set of predictors, and k is the 
number of predictors, kXX ...1 is the predictor, 10,ββ  are the regression coefficients and ε  is the 
error term 
Hypothesis D: 
Ho :   
( )
( ) εβ +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=
0|4Pr
|Pr
X
X
Y
iYLog
       
         (3-11) 
 
HA:   
( )
( ) εββ ++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=
110|4Pr
|Pr X
Y
iYLog
X
X
      
         (3-12) 
 
Where ( )X|Pr iY =  are the odds of selecting choice igiven the predictor, and k is the number of 
predictors, kXX ...1 is the predictor, 10,ββ  are the regression coefficients and ε  is the error term 
For all four hypotheses, α < 0.05 will be used as an acceptance/rejection criterion. 
3.4.1 Independent Variables 
 
Based on the hypotheses of the study there are two sets of continuous independent 
variables for both the regression and multinomial models: 
• The average scores for all the participants for each of the seven categories in the 
safety climate questionnaire. 
• The composite score of the seven categories of the safety climate questionnaire. 
3.4.2 Dependent Variables 
 
For hypotheses A and B, the continuous variable S_SI is the dependent variable. It is 
calculated using equation 3-2: 
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For hypotheses C and D, the categorical (e.g., nominal) variable, choice is the dependent 
variable. The categories for this variable are agree, just ignore, report without details, and report 
with details, which were established in the decision scenario. 
3.4.3 Predictive Models 
 
Multiple regression analysis uses a set of predictors to predict a continuous response (i.e., 
a dependant variable that is continuous). The simple regression analysis is the same as multiple 
regression analysis except it only has one predictor. Multinomial regression analysis is similar to 
multiple and simple regression analysis in that it uses a set or one predictors (i.e., independent 
variables that are continuous or categorical), but it tries to predict a categorical response (i.e., a 
dependant variable that is categorical). Therefore, multiple regression analysis will be used to 
address hypothesis A. Simple regression analysis will be used to address hypothesis B. 
Multinomial regression analysis will be utilized to find a predictive model for hypotheses C and 
D. The software Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, version 15.0) will be used to 
run the analysis on both of these predictive models. 
In the multiple and simple regression analysis, it is expected that an increase in safety 
climate scores (the averages of seven predictors or the composite of seven predictors) will lead to 
a higher S_SI, which reflects safer oriented decision-making. The mathematical representation of 
these models is as follows: 
Multiple Regression Analysis: 
 
εβββ ++++= kk XXY ...110                           (3-13) 
 
Simple Regression Analysis: 
 
εββ ++= 110 XY                             (3-14) 
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where  
 Y= Dependent variable (e.g., S_SI) 
kXX ,...,1 = Independent variables (the averages for seven predictors or the composite of 
seven predictors) 
kββ ,...,1 = Regression coefficients corresponding to each predictor 
0β  = y -intercept, the value of ywhen all predictors are zero 
k = the number of predictors for hypothesis A, k = 7 or 1 
ε  = is the error term (i.e., potential noise in the data). 
For the purpose of this study, S_SI was the primary interest in the information acquisition 
process. The model simultaneously describes the effects of the set of predictors on S_SI. An F-
test was used to test whether all the regression coefficients (β ) equal zero at the same time (α  = 
0.05). If this is rejected, it suggests that at least some of the predictors have an effect on S_SI. 
Each estimated regression coefficient (e.g., βˆ) reflects the effect of a particular predictor 
on the S_SI when all the other predictors remain unchanged. The estimated coefficients are 
interpreted as follow: 
For example, if βˆ  for commitment is 0.5, it is expected that for every unit increase in 
commitment scores, the participants S_SI will increases by 0.5 when all other scores remain the 
same.  
If β  > 0, then S_SI will increase as the predictive variable increase. 
 
If α  > 0.05 then there is no significant evidence that β  is different from zero. In other words, the 
corresponding predictor for that beta will not be useful in predicting S_SI. 
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In the multinomial regression analysis, it is expected that an increase in safety climate 
scores (the averages of seven predictors or the composite of seven predictors) will lead to higher 
odds of choosing choice 4, report with details (e.g. use as the reference, because it is considered 
to be the safest choice). The mathematical representation of these models is as follows: 
( )
( ) εβββ +++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=
kk XXY
iYLog ,...,
|4Pr
|Pr
110X
X , i =1, 2, 3.            (3-15) 
 
( )
( ) εββ ++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=
110|4Pr
|Pr X
Y
iYLog
X
X , i =1, 2, 3.                 (3-16) 
 
where  
 Y  = Dependent variable (i.e., choice 1 - 4) 
i = 1(agree), 2(just ignore), 3(report without details)  
kXX ,...,1  = Independent variables (the average scores for seven predictors or the 
composite score of seven predictors) 
kββ ,...,1 = Regression coefficients corresponding to each predictor. 
0β = y-intercept is the value of the logit when all predictors are zero. 
k = Is the number of predictors, for hypothesis B, k = 7 or 1 
( )X|Pr iY =  = is the probability that the dependent variable Y  (i.e., choice) equals choice i, 
given the set of predictors ( )kXX ,...,1=X  
( )X|4Pr =Y  = is the probability that choice 4 (report with details) is chosen given the set of 
predictors. 
( )
( )X
X
|4Pr
|Pr
=
=
Y
iY = The odds of selecting choice i instead of choice 4 
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( )
( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=
X
X
|4Pr
|Pr
Y
iYLog  = The logit (i.e., log of the odds), i = 1, 2, and 3 
 
In this predictive model, choice 4 (report with details) was chosen as a baseline/reference 
category because it was ranked the most important in terms of safety. The model simultaneously 
describes the effects of the set of predictors on the three logits (equation 3 - 15). The exponent of 
the estimated regression coefficients ( ( )βexp ) reflects multiplicative effects of the predictors on 
the odds that participants will select one of the other three choices instead of report with details. 
( )βexp  is the odds ratio calculated as the odds at an additional unit for the predictor (e.g., X = x 
+ 1) divided by the odds at the initial value of the predictor (e.g., X = x). This is denoted as: 
The estimated coefficients odds ratios are interpreted as follows: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( )
1ˆ
|4Pr
|Pr
1|4YPR
|Pr
1 βe
xY
xiY
x
xiY
odds
odds =
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
==
==
+==
+==
=Χ
+Χ
X
X
X
X
1
      
        
(3-17) 
 
 
For example, in the equation (3-15) for the first logit (when i = 1); assumes ( )βexp for 
commitment is 0.5, then, for every unit increase in commitment score, the odds that participants 
select ignore (choice 1) instead of report with details (choice 4) increases multiplicatively by 0.5. 
Equivalently, the odds that a participant select report with details (choice 4) instead of ignore 
(choice 1) increases multiplicatively by 2 (e.g., 1/0.5). The estimated probability plots are also 
used to illustrate the effect of the predictor in the result section. 
If exp (β) < 1, then choice 4 is preferred  
 
If α  > 0.05 then there is no significant difference in the odds of choosing i or choice 4 as the 
predictor increases by one unit. 
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3.5 Participants 
 
Participants were employees of a manufacturing facility in the state of Iowa. The facility 
employs 186 workers. From this group, 111 front line employees participated in the research. 
Participants were comprised primarily of production and maintenance workers from all three 
shifts (i.e., 24-hour period). To maintain the anonymity of each participant, an ID number was 
given to each participant. This ID number was randomly assigned for completion of both the 
questionnaire and Decision-Mind scenario. 
On average, participants completed both the questionnaire and Decision-Mind scenario in 
15 minutes. The data was collected over a three-day period, during February 21 - 23, 2007. 
The purpose and aim of the study were introduced to each participant, with a consent 
letter. The participants voluntarily agreed to participate in the study (e.g., questionnaire and 
scenario). Participants were allowed to ask clarifying questions during their interaction with both 
programs. In addition, participants were provided with technical assistance if any technical 
difficulty arose with the web-based programs. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis. First, a summary of the data collected 
will be presented. Then, the results from the predictive models will be discussed. 
4.2 Safety Climate Survey 
 
The statements in the questionnaire were constructed to address one of the seven areas of 
interest in this study (management commitment, communication, functionality of organizational 
safety, role of safety performance in promotion, physical work environment, compliance with 
procedures, and competence). Therefore, the average rating of each statement indicates the 
participants’ perceptions of how these seven areas are being operationalized within their 
organization. The composite of the seven categories was constructed to represent the level of 
safety climate within the participants’ place of employment. 
The dimension for management commitment had an average rating of 3.4 with a standard 
deviation of 0.75 (Figure 4.2). The distribution of the ratings for management commitment 
indicate that in average participants neither agree nor disagree than agree on the general 
strength of commitment management. Seven items addressed the dimension of management 
commitment (Figure 4.3). Two items in this category scored an average below three, which 
presents a major concern: 
• “Work will not begin until we are properly staffed to perform work safely,” average of 
2.5. 
• “Exemplary safety performance is recognized/awarded,” average of 2.9. 
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of scores in Management Commitment 
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Figure 4.3. Average for statements in Management Commitment 
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These are alarming values. Zohar (2002), Zohar and Luria (2003), and Zohar and Erev 
(2007) suggest that these two items are critical to participants’ safety performance. They indicate 
that management, who makes safety contingent upon productivity, cause employees to infer that 
safety has low priority. Their studies demonstrate that safety behaviors depend largely on 
external supervisory contingencies (i.e., rewards and work pressures) rather than internal self-
preservation considerations. 
The dimension communication of safety goals and expectations had an average rating of 
3.9 and a standard deviation of 0.63 (Figure 4.4). The data indicates that on average participants 
agreed that the company communicated safety goals and expectations well. Four items addressed 
the dimension of communication (Figure 4.5). The general perception is that management 
communicates safety goals and expectations very well (μ = 4.1). However, upper management 
receptivity to middle management (i.e. line supervisor) concerns for safety improvement was 
rated the lowest (μ =3.5). 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of scores in Communication  
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Figure 4.5. Average for statements in Communication 
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Zohar (2002) and Zohar & Luria (2003) suggest that the level of safety communication 
between upper management and middle management is a main criterion of how participants view 
the functionality of safety within the organization. The authors argue that safety priority dictated 
by upper management influences supervisors’ safety practices and leadership styles. 
The dimension functionality of organizational safety had an average rating of 3.7 and a 
standard deviation of 0.64 (Figure 4.6). The data indicate that there is some agreement with 
regards to the strength of functionality of organizational safety. Six items addressed the 
dimension of functionality of organizational safety (Figure 4.7). The general perception is that 
management insists on investigating accidents (μ = 4.0). However, management and safety staff 
seems to struggle with enforcing SOPs (policies and procedures) (μ = 3.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57
5.004.504.003.503.002.502.001.501.00
20
15
10
5
0
Mean =3.69
Std. Dev. =0.698
N =111
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Distribution of scores in Functionality of Organizational Safety  
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Figure 4.7. Average for statements in Functionality of Organizational Safety 
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3.49
3.18
Safety staff enforces safe working 
practices on employees
Safety staff enforces safe working 
practices on managers
The defiance of SOPs has been correlated with risk-taking behaviors (Bax et al., 1998; 
Hudson et al., 1998; Lee, 1996; McDonald, 1998; Reason et al., 1998). Lee (1996) showed that 
failure to enforce safety policies and procedures correlates with risk-taking behaviors, and is 
highly connected with accident involvement in the workplace. 
The dimension safety performance had an average rating of 3.3 and a standard deviation 
of 0.16. Some participants agreed that the company communicates, measures, and reports the 
safety performance of the organization. Two items addressed the dimension of safety 
performance (Figure 4.8). The general perception is that management provides performance 
feedback to participants (μ = 3.5). However, participants seemed to be uncertain if their safety 
performance played any role for potential promotion (μ = 3.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Average for statements in Safety Performance 
 
This is an area of interest that has not been studied extensively in any of the literature 
reviewed in this study. However, safety performance and its role in participant promotion were 
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assumed to be a key criterion of how participants perceive the value of safety in their 
organization. 
The dimension physical environment had an average rating of 3.5 and a standard 
deviation of 0.65 (Figure 4.9). There is some agreement that the physical work environment was 
comfortable and safe. Four items addressed the dimension of physical environment (Figure 4.10). 
There is strong agreement that management requires a clean and orderly work environment (μ = 
e 4.5). However, participants did not find their work environment comfortable (μ = 3.1). 
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Figure 4.9. Distribution of scores in Physical Environment 
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Figure 4.10. Average for statements in Physical Environment 
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The dimension compliance with procedures had an average rating of 3.5 and a standard 
deviation of 0.65 (Figure 4.11). The data indicate that more participants agreed that co-worker 
and supervisors were supportive of safety in the work environment. Six items addressed the 
dimension of compliance with procedures (Figure 4.12). In general, participants feel comfortable 
with each other to say “no” to taking short-cuts (μ = 3.8). However, the participants are less 
likely to report each other for taking short-cuts (μ = 3.1). 
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Figure 4.11. Distribution of scores in Compliance with Procedures 
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Figure 4.12. Average for statements in Compliance with Procedures 
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These finding are supported by the results of the analysis of the decision-making 
simulator, which will be discussed later. Recent studies have identified that peer-pressure (i.e., 
team pressure to meet production goals) along with pressure from upper management, is a 
determining factor in establishing perceived work pressure (Havold, 2005; Michael et al., 2005). 
The combination of these two determinant factors creates the overall workforce perception of the 
balance maintained between productivity and safety. This notion is evident in a study conducted 
by Dedobbeleer and Beland (1998). Their study demonstrated that the tendency of workers to 
take risks or ignore procedures was highly correlated to their perception of working in a high 
stress environment. 
The dimension competence had an average rating of 3.7 and a standard deviation of 0.64 
(Figure 4.13). The data indicate that more participants agreed that the workforce had a good 
working knowledge of safety procedures. Six items addressed the dimension of competence 
(Figure 4.14). In general, participants indicated that management is familiar with safety policies 
and procedures (μ = 4.0). However, participants do not fully agree that the knowledge gained 
from safety training helps improve safety performance (μ = 3.7). However, despite the fact that 
this is the lowest score in this dimension, it is high relative to the highest scored item. 
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Figure 4.13. Distribution of scores in Competence 
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Figure 4.14. Average for statements in Competence 
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Competence presents workers’ perceptions of the level of qualifications, skills and knowledge 
possessed by both co-workers and management. This perception is highly correlated to 
management practices such as selection, training, and assessment of competence standards (Flin 
et al., 2000). These management practices are likely influenced by broader economic conditions, 
such as the labor market and training budgets (Helmreich et al., 1998; Flin et al., 2000; Flin & 
O’Connor, 2000). In turn, these economic conditions affect the adoption of specific maintenance 
policies and procedures (e.g., educational requirements, assessment of competence standards) 
within an organization (Baxet al., 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Hudson et al., 1998; McDonald, 
1998; Reason et al., 1998). 
The composite score had an average rating of 3.7 and a standard deviation of 0.64 (Figure 
4.15). All categories’ average values were higher than 3 (neither agree nor disagree). The 
categories that scored highest are competencies (μ = 3.9) and communication (μ = 3.9) (Figure 
4.16). The data indicate that more participants agreed that the strength of the safety climate was 
above average within their organization. The combination of the averages of all seven factors 
accounted for the composite score. In general, participants perceive that management is meeting 
the minimum requirement of balancing the need for productivity and the need for safety within 
the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70
5.004.504.003.503.002.502.001.501.00
q
y
25
20
15
10
5
0
Mean =3.62
Std. Dev. =0.522
N =111
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15. Distribution of All 33 Statements in the Questionnaire 
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Figure 4.16. Category averages for Safety Climate Survey 
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4.3 Decision-Making Search Indices (SI) and Choice 
  
4.3.1 Search Indices (SI) 
 
Hypotheses A and B address the correlation between the strength of safety climate and safety-
oriented decision-making process. The search indices were calculated as described in the 
methodology section. As previously mentioned in the methodology section, the search indices 
reflect the level of attention paid to a particular evaluation of an alternative against a dimension; 
in comparison to the average attention paid to the other evaluations of the other alternatives 
against the other dimensions. A value of one indicates that the attention paid to a specific 
dimension is similar to the average interest of the other dimensions. Thus, a T-test was used to 
benchmark the data on the indices against a mean value of one. The results are available in table 
4.3, include the p-value for the benchmark (against one). The distribution of the safety search 
index (S_SI), productivity search index (Prod_SI), peer pressure search index (Pres_SI), and 
promotion search index (Prom_SI) are presented in figure 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20, 
respectively. As Table 4.3 indicate Pres_SI was the most searched dimension during the 
participants’ decision-making process (μ = 1.675). It was the only index that was found to be 
significantly different than one ( 0001.0<ρ ) 
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Table 4.3 The Number of Times Dimensions were Reviewed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Search Index Mean Standard Deviation
 
p-value
Safety Search Index 
 
1.051 0.823 0.651
Productivity Search Index 
 
0.844 0.665 0.015
Peer Pressure Search Index 
 
1.675 1.184 <0.0001
Promotion Search Index 
 
1.003 0.957 0.972
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Figure 4.17. Distribution of S_SI Values 
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Figure 4.18. Distribution Prod_SI Values 
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Figure 4.19. Distribution of Pres_SI Values 
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Figure 4.20. Distribution of Prom_SI Values 
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illustrated that the participants showed no interest in the dimension promotion (μ = 1.0, α  = 
0.97). This lack of interest may have been affected by their uncertainty if their safety 
performance played any role for potentially being promoted (μ = 3.2). 
4.3.2 Choice 
 
Hypotheses C and D address the correlation between the strength of safety climate and 
the selection of a safer alternative. The distribution of the selection of the alternatives is 
presented in Table 4.4. Report without details was selected by 43.2 % of the participants. 
Participants’ unwillingness to report each other was earlier indicated in the questionnaire. 
From the ratings on the dimension compliance with procedures, participants neither agreed nor 
disagreed that unsafe behaviors are reported (μ = 3.1). However, it appears that “when” and “if” 
they had to make a choice, the tendency of most participants would be to report the incident but 
not the co-worker. Additionally, the intense interest on the decision dimension Peer Pressure 
indicated the concern the participants had with potential conflict with co-workers. In order to test 
the hypotheses of this study multiple, simple, and multinomial regression analysis were used. 
 
Table 4.4 Distribution of Selection of Final Choice  
Choices 
 
# % 
Agree 
 
11 9.3 
Just Ignore 
 
20 17.0 
Report without Details 
 
51 43.2 
Report with details 
 
29 26.13 
None response 
 
6 5.1 
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4.4 Multiple Regression Analysis to Test Hypothesis A 
 
 To test hypothesis A, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. This regression 
analysis tested whether the average scores of the seven dimensions are significant predictors of a 
safety-oriented information search. The results of the multiple regression analysis are available 
in Table 4.5. A p-value of 0.461 indicates that the strength of safety climate is not a significant 
predictor of S_SI. 
 
Table 4.5 Summaries of the Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis: Average of the Seven 
Predictors  
Model 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Regression 
 
 Residual 
 
 Total 
 
4.587 
 
69.998 
 
74.585 
7 
 
103 
 
110 
0.655 
 
0.680 
0.964 0.461 
 
 Further evidence of the lack of significance was noted in the value of R-square (R2). The 
value for R2 with the average scores of the seven predictors is 0.062. This value indicates that 
only 6.2% of the variability in the dependant variable can be explained by the independent 
variables. 
However, to ensure the reliability of the regression results, the data was tested for 
multicollinearity (e.g., high correlation among the independent variables). A data set with 
multicollinearity indicates that the independent variables are affected by each other. Thus, 
inflating the standard errors of the regression coefficients and leading to inaccurate result for the 
F-test. In order to check for multicollinearity among the variables Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) value was given for each dimension.  
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A VIF value greater than 4 is an indication that there may be problems with the variable 
(e.g., multicollinearity) (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2005). However, serious concerns or 
actions (i.e., removing or reconstructing the item) are usually taken only if VIF values are greater 
than 10. The dimension functionality of organizational safety had the highest VIF value of 4.102. 
And the dimension safety performance had the lowest VIF value of 1.292, suggesting that this 
variable has low correlation with other predictors. But overall, the VIF values for the 
independent variables did not present serious concerns of multicollinearity.  
In summary, the analysis failed to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis A: The seven 
safety climate categories cannot predict safety oriented decision-making process. 
4.5 Simple Linear Regression Analysis to Test Hypothesis B 
 
A simple linear regression analysis was conducted to determine the significance of the 
correlation between the composite score of safety climate questionnaire and SS_I. The results are 
presented in Table 4.6. A p-value of 0.138 indicates that the composite score of safety climate is 
not a significant predictor of S_SI. 
 
Table 4.6 Summary of the Results of the Simple Linear Regression Analysis: Composite Score  
Model 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 
 
Residual 
 
Total 
 
1.497 
 
73.088 
 
74.585 
7 
 
109 
 
110 
1.497 
 
0.671 
2.232 0.138 
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Further evidence of the lack of significance was noted in by R2. R2 for the simple linear 
regression analysis with the composite score of the safety climate questionnaire was 0.020. This 
value indicates that only 2.0% of the variability in the dependent variable (S_SI) can be 
explained by the independent variable (the composite of seven predictors). There were no 
concerns with multicollineary, because only one independent variable is involved in this simple 
linear regression model. Thus, VIF is not relevant. 
In summary, the analysis failed to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis B: The 
composite safety climate score cannot predict safety oriented decision-making process. 
4.6 Multinomial Regression Analysis to Test Hypothesis C 
 
A multinomial regression analysis was conducted to test whether the averages of the 
seven safety climate dimensions predicts choice of a safer alternative. The results of the 
multinomial regression analysis is presented in Table 4.7. The results indicate that the averages 
of the seven safety climate dimensions were not a significant predictor of choosing a safer 
alternative, p-value is 0.512. 
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Table 4.7 Results of Multinomial regression Analysis: Average of the Seven Predictors 
Effects Chi-Square df p-value 
Commitment 1.979 3 0.577 
Communication  1.254 3 0.740 
Functionality of Organizational Safety 1.952 3 0.582 
Safety Performance 0.517 3 0.915 
Compliance with procedures 0.874 3 0.832 
Physical Working Environment 1.477 3 0.687 
Competence 2.922 3 0.404 
 
Thus, the analysis failed to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis C: The seven safety 
climate categories cannot predict selection of a safer choice. 
4.7 Multinomial Regression Analysis to Test Hypothesis D 
 
A multinomial regression analysis was conducted to test whether the composite of the 
seven safety climate dimensions predicted choice of a safer alternative. The results of the 
multinomial regression analysis is presented in Table 4.8. The results indicate that the composite 
of the seven safety climate dimensions was a significant predictor of choosing a safer alternative 
(p-value is 0.019). Thus, hypothesis D is rejected. 
 
 
Table 4.8 Results of Multinomial regression Analysis: Composite Score as a Predictor 
Effects Chi-Square df p-value 
Composite 9.989 3 0.019 
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4.8 Likelihood of Selecting a Choice as a Function of Composite 
Score 
 
The exponent coefficient estimates indicate that there were differences among the choices 
(Table 4.9). The reciprocal of the exponent coefficient estimate between choices 1 and 4 indicate 
that for every unit of increase in the composite score of seven predictors, participants was 5.21 
(e.g., 1/0.192, α  = 0.025) times more likely to choose choice 4 over choice 1. The exponent 
coefficient estimate between choices 2 and 4 indicates that for every unit of increase in the 
composite score of seven predictors, participant was 5.61 times more likely to choose choice 4 
over choice 2. The exponent coefficient estimate between choices 3 and 4 indicates that for every 
unit of increase in the composite score of seven predictors, participants was 3.04 times more 
likely to choose choice 4 over choice 3. 
 
 
Table 4.9 Results of Multinomial regression Analysis 
Choice recorded 
 
β Std. Error Sig. Exp (β) 
1 Intercept 
 
1 Composite 
 
5.082 
 
-1.650 
2.681 
 
0.736 
0.058 
 
0.025 
 
 
0.192 
2 Intercept 
 
2 Composite 
5.938 
 
-1.725 
 
2.327 
 
0.632 
0.011 
 
0.006 
 
 
0.178 
3 Intercept 
 
3 Composite 
 
4.709 
 
-1.111 
1.995 
 
0.525 
0.018 
 
0.034 
 
 
0.329 
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A visual illustration of these estimated probabilities for choosing choices 1to 4 against 
the independent variable (the composite of seven predictors) is shown in Figure 4.21. These 
estimated probabilities were derived from the estimated logit equations with composite score as 
the predictor; as follows: 
For i = 1, ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 110 *650.1082.5expˆˆexp|4Pr |1Pr aXXYY ≡−=+=== ββXX  (4 - 1) 
For i = 2, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 210 *725.1938.5expˆˆexp|4Pr |2Pr aXXYY ≡−=+=== ββXX  (4 - 2) 
For i = 3, ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 310 *111.1709.4expˆˆexp|4Pr |3Pr aXXYY ≡−=+=== ββXX  (4 - 3) 
From the logit equations (4 – 1 to 4 - 3) above, 
( ) ( )XX |4Pr*|1Pr 1 === YaY  (4 - 4) 
( ) ( )XX |4Pr*|2Pr 2 === YaY  (4 - 4) 
( ) ( )XX |4Pr*|3Pr 3 === YaY  (4 - 5) 
Also,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )XXXX
XXXX
|4Pr1|3Pr|2Pr|1Pr
1|4Pr|3Pr|2Pr|1Pr
=−==+=+=⇔
==+=+=+=
YYYY
YYYY
 (4 - 6) 
Summing Eq. 4 – 7 to 4 - 6, yield 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1*|4Pr|3Pr|2Pr|1Pr 321 +++===+=+= aaaYYYY XXXX  (4 - 7) 
Following substituting Eq. 4 - 7 into Eq. 4 - 8, equation 4 - 8 have the following form: 
( ) ( ) ( )1*|4Pr1|4Pr1 321 +++=−==− aaaYY XX  (4 - 9) 
Hence, the estimated probabilities for a selection of the choices as a function of the composite 
score are derived to be: 
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Figure 4.21. Likelihood of Selection of a Safer Alternative as a Function of Composite  
Score 
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As figure 4.21 reveals, the likelihood of selecting alternatives with negative evaluation on 
the safety dimension (Safety) decreases with an increase of strength of safety climate(Strength – 
represented by the composite score). Moreover, the likelihood for the alternative with the lower 
evaluation on “Safety” is lower than the likelihood for the one with the higher (still negative) 
evaluation. 
As for the alternatives with positive evaluation on Safety: the alternative “Report without 
Details” had likelihood higher than the alternative “Report with Details” (which had higher 
evaluation on Safety) for a range of Strength of less than 4. When Strength is greater than four, 
the alternative with the higher evaluation on Safety has the highest likelihood for being selected. 
The fact that for the range of Strength that is less than 4, the alternative “Report without 
Details” was more likely to be selected than the safer alternative, might be explained by the 
extensive interest in “Peer-Pressure” during the decision task. It is possible that this interest 
reflects a concern with the response of employees to reporting their colleagues, should they 
decide to provide details on the case. Eventually though, the likelihood of selecting the 
alternative that included reporting details on their colleagues was the highest when safety climate 
strength was very high (four or higher). 
The change in trend in the likelihood of selecting alternative 3 as a function of Strength 
around composite score value of 3 - 3.5 could not be explained, and is require further study. 
Of the four hypotheses, a hypothesis D is the only one that presents significant 
relationship between strength of safety climate and safety  decision-making. The results 
suggested that the strength of safety climate (composite score)is a significant predictor of 
selecting a safer alternative. 
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION  
 
5.1 Summary 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the strength of safety 
climate and the orientation toward safety in decision-making processes and choice (Safety 
Decision-Making). In order to study this relationship an experiment was designed and conducted. 
The study was conducted in a manufacturing facility in Iowa. The study included 111 of the 186 
employees in the facility, over the web. Two web-based instruments were used, a safety climate 
questionnaire followed by a decision-making simulation. 
The following four hypotheses have been employed to analyze this relationship: 
Hypothesis A: The seven safety climate categories cannot predict safety oriented 
decision-making process 
 
Hypothesis B: The composite safety climate score cannot predict safety oriented 
decision-making process 
 
Hypothesis C: The seven safety climate categories cannot predict selection of safer 
choice 
 
Hypothesis D: The composite safety climate score cannot predict selection of safer 
choice 
 
A multiple regression analysis model was used to test hypothesis A, a simple linear regression 
analysis to test hypothesis B, and multinomial regression analyses for hypotheses C and D. 
The analysis failed to reject hypothesis A (ρ > 0.05 for all seven categories); the seven 
categories of the safety climate questionnaire was not a significant predictor of safety oriented 
information acquisition (denoted by S_SI). Likewise, the composite score of the seven categories 
of the safety climate questionnaire were not found to be a significant predictor of safety oriented 
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information acquisition (ρ > 0.05 for composite score); thus, the analysis failed to reject 
hypothesis B 
As for predicting a selection of a safer choice: the analysis failed to reject hypothesis C. 
The seven categories were not a significant predictor of the selection of a safer choice (ρ > 0.05 
for all seven categories); however, the composite score of safety climate was a significant 
predictor of a safer choice (ρ = 0.019).e.g. hypothesis D was rejected. 
Safety climate questionnaire was developed and validated by Factorial Analyses. The 33 
questions in the questionnaires were grouped into seven categories, as follows: 
• Management Commitment to safety, 
• Communication, 
• The functionality of organizational Safety, 
• Role of Safety Performance, 
• Physical working environment, 
• Compliance with procedures, and 
• competencies 
Participants were asked to rank their level of agreement on the 33 statements, on a scale of one 
through five, where one represents strongly disagreed, three represents neither agree nor 
disagree, and five represents strongly agree. 
All seven categories had an average value greater than three (neither agree nor disagree). 
The categories that scored highest are competence (μ = 3.9) and communication (μ = 3.9). 
The statements addressing the competence category surveyed the perception that 
participants had towards the adequacy of safety training, familiarity of key personnel with safety 
procedures, and ease of interpreting safety documents. This perception is highly correlated to 
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management practices such as selection, training, and assessment of competence standards (Flin 
et al., 2000). 
The statements addressing the communication category surveyed participants’ perception 
of their organization communication of safety goals/ expectations and performance, and 
supervisors’ openness towards participants’ safety concerns. These categories received the 
lowest scores among the seven categories, where, safety performance had an average of 3.3 and 
management commitment had an average of 3.4. 
It is important to note that literature documented patterns of improvement in attitude 
toward safety performance when these are perceived benefits to working safely (Zohar & Luria, 
2003; Zohar & Erev, 2007). 
The statements addressing management commitment surveyed participants’ perception of 
the level of commitment that management had towards safety. Despite the low average of the 
management commitment category, the statement that specifically addressed management 
commitment to safety had an average of four. However, two items in this category scored an 
average of below three, and are a source of major concern: 
• Work will not begin until we are properly staffed to perform work safely, which 
received an average of 2.5; and 
• Exemplary safety performance is recognized/awarded, which received an average of 
2.9 
The low perception on these two statements requires immediate attention by management. 
Defiance of safety policies and procedures has been correlated with risk-taking behaviors (Bax et 
al., 1998; Hudson et al., 1998; Lee, 1998; McDonald, 1998; Reason et al., 1998). 
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The Decision MindTM simulator recorded key features of the decision-making process 
from each participant: 
• The number of items viewed by participants, 
• The sequence of the review of information, and 
• The final choice selected by each participant. 
The value of the four search indices (Pres_SI), Safety (S_SI), Productivity (Prod_SI), and 
Promotion (Prom_SI) have been calculated. These values have been statistically compared to 
“one,” utilizing T-test (One represents an average interest in a dimension in comparison to the 
interest in other dimensions). Information on the implications of peer pressure on the alternative 
gained the highest attention (average Pres_SI = 1.7, 0001.0<ρ ). The values of the other indices 
were not found to be significantly different than “one” (with respect to α = 0.05). 
The decision scenario addressed a situation where the participants are being offered to 
take a short-cut from the standard operation procedures. The four alternatives are to: 
1) Agree to take the short-cut, 
2) Ignore the suggestion to take the short-cut, 
3) Report the incident to supervisors without details of the employees involved, and 
 4) Report the incident to supervisors with details of the employees involved. 
Alternative 3, report without details was the most frequently selected alternative (selected by 
43.2 % of the participants). Based on the scenario, the selection of alternative three indicates 
safety consciousness among the participants. The score on the safety climate questionnaire 
foreshadowed the fact that reporting with details (selected by 26.1% of the participants) would 
not be the most favorite choice. This is supported by the level of interest in Peer Pressure during 
the process of evaluating the alternatives. Further evidence of this choice was earlier indicated in 
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the safety climate questionnaire, where participants rated that they will not necessarily report 
each other for taking short-cuts (μ = 3.1). Despite, the significant attention to peer pressure, the 
high perception of management commitment (μ = 4.0) to safety may have significantly 
influenced the high response rate for the second safest choice report without detail. 
 Calculation of estimated probability (likelihood) of selecting alternative indicated that 
alternative with negative evaluation on the dimension of safety have a negative likelihood trend, 
and when strength of safety climate increases. The trend for alternatives with positive evaluation 
was positive, other than a change in trend for alternative 3 (report without details) in higher 
strength levels. 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
This study established an empirical link between the aggregated measures of the strength 
of safety climate and choosing a safer alternative; however, it failed to demonstrate relationship 
with the process. This study showed the significant impact that peer pressure has on the level of 
safety performance within an organization. The complex relationship between safety climate and 
safety decision-making requires further attention from researchers. Additional efforts in studying 
the underlying factors that create the relationship between safety climate and decision-making 
may establish the link between strength of safety climate and decision-making process. 
5.3 Recommendations 
 
Carroll (1998) suggests that, safety climate factors may highlight where system and 
physical changes are required within an organization, as well as changes of safety related 
behaviors at all hierarchical levels. It is important that further efforts should review the 
relationship between safety climate and safety decision-making at all hierarchical levels (CEOs, 
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managers, supervisors, and key safety personnel) of the organizations. The findings should be 
analyzed for the difference among levels in the hierarchy. 
Despite the four and a half decades of studying safety climate, this present study 
recognizes that significant advancement is needed in this field. Further studies that incorporate 
behavioral observations may bridge the gap in understanding the relationship between safety 
climate and safety decision-making with bricks of knowledge. 
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APPENDIX A: FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
1.1 Factor Analysis 
 
 Factor Analysis was used to validate the safety climate questionnaire. The purpose of 
factor analysis is to discover simple patterns among the variables. In particular, it seeks to 
determine if the observed variables can be explained by a smaller number of underlying factors. 
More than one factor may exist for a given set of items. This may result from items that fit better 
with another factor. In all but one case, all the items fit comfortably on a single factor. These 
factors included six preplanned dimensions contained within the questionnaire (management 
commitment, communication, functionality of safety, compliance with procedures, physical work 
environment, and competence). 
 The principal component extraction method indicated that each dimension had one factor 
with the exception of functionality of safety (An earlier effort at factor analysis attempted to use 
maximum likelihood extraction methods. The maximum likelihood results were not appropriate 
for the analytical purposes of this paper. This appendix presents the correlation, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics, total variations explained by the factor, communalities, and 
component factor loadings of the statements in each dimension. The Cronbach’s Alpha values 
will later be presented in this section. 
1.1.2 Correlations 
 
Tables A.10 to A.23 display the correlations among the items contained in the 
dimensions. The correlation is the measurement of the linear relationship of the items (i.e., 
“strength” and “direction”). 
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Table A.10 Correlation Matrix: Management Commitment to Safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All results p ≤ .001 
 
 
 
 
 
Committed 
 
Climate 
 
Examples 
 
Properly staff 
 
Awarded 
 
Stop work 
 
Concerns 
addressed 
 
Committed 
 
1.000 
 
0.709 
 
0.417 
 
0.483 
 
0.365 
 
0.342 
 
0.543 
 
Climate 
 
0.709 
 
1.000 
 
0.490 
 
0.524 
 
0.300 
 
0.391 
 
0.544 
 
Examples 
 
0.417 
 
0.490 
 
1.000 
 
0.519 
 
0.345 
 
0.342 
 
0.444 
 
Properly staff 
 
0.483 
 
0.524 
 
0.519 
 
1.000 
 
0.420 
 
0.375 
 
0.578 
 
Awarded 
 
0.365 
 
0.300 
 
0.345 
 
0.420 
 
1.000 
 
0.406 
 
0.485 
 
Stop work 
 
0.342 
 
0.391 
 
0.342 
 
0.375 
 
0.406 
 
1.000 
 
0.471 
 
Concerns 
addressed 
 
0.543 
 
0.544 
 
0.444 
 
0.578 
 
0.485 
 
0.471 
 
1.000 
 
   95 
Table A.11 Correlation Matrix: Communication of Safety Expectations/Goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All results p < .001 
 
 
 
 
Communicated 
 
Define goals 
 
Receptive 
 
Report 
 
Communicated 
 
1.000 
 
0.760 
 
0.451 
 
0.492 
 
Define goals 
 
0.760 
 
1.000 
 
0.380 
 
0.485 
 
Receptive 
 
0.451 
 
0.380 
 
1.000 
 
0.329 
 
Report 0.492 
 
0.485 
 
0.329 
 
1.000 
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Table A.12 Correlation Matrix: Functionality of Organizational Safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All results p ≤ .232 
 
 
 
 
Stop 
work 2 
Safety 
available 
Investigated 
 
Timely 
investigation 
Performance 
feedback 
Role in 
promotion 
Enforcement 
 
Enforcement 2 
 
Stop work 2 
 
1.000 
 
0.533 
 
0.296 
 
0.374 
 
0.236 
 
0.100 
 
0.338 
 
0.480 
 
Safety available 0.533 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
0.594 
 
 
0.553 
 
 
0.090 
 
 
0.241 
 
 
0.512 
 
 
0.522 
 
 
Investigated 
 
0.296 
 
0.594 
 
1.000 
 
0.694 
 
0.122 
 
0.288 
 
0.446 
 
0.447 
 
Timely 
investigation 
 
0.374 
 
 
0.553 
 
 
0.694 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
0.070 
 
 
0.235 
 
 
0.438 
 
 
0.499 
 
 
Performance 
feedback 
 
0.236 
 
 
0.090 
 
 
0.122 
 
 
0.070 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
0.226 
 
 
0.261 
 
 
0.212 
 
 
Role in  
Promotion 
 
0.100 
 
 
0.241 
 
 
0.288 
 
 
0.235 
 
 
0.226 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
0.388 
 
 
0.367 
 
 
Enforcement 0.338 
 
 
0.512 
 
 
0.446 
 
 
0.438 
 
 
0.261 
 
 
0.388 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
0.714 
 
 
Enforcement 2 
 
0.480 
 
0.522 
 
0.447 
 
0.499 
 
0.212 
 
0.367 
 
0.714 
 
1.000 
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Table A.13 Correlation Matrix: Physical Working Environment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All results p ≤ .060 
 
 
Table A.14 Correlation Matrix: Compliance with Procedures 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 All results P ≤ .081
 
Conditions 
 
Concerns repaired 
 
Tools/equipments are adequate  
to perform my job safely 
Clean 
 
Conditions 
 
1.000 
 
0.492 
 
0.294 
 
0.214 
 
Concerns repaired 
 
0.492 
 
1.000 
 
0.331 
 
0.269 
 
Tools/equipments are adequate to 
perform my job safely 
 
0.294 
 
 
0.331 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
0.149 
 
 
Clean 
 
0.214 
 
0.269 
 
0.149 
 
1.000 
 
 
No shortcuts 
 
Report co-workers 
 
No shortcuts 2 
 
Not affected 
 
Report me 
 
No shortcuts 
 
1.000 
 
0.327 
 
0.455 
 
0.384 
 
0.368 
 
Report co-workers 
 
0.327 
 
1.000 
 
0.134 
 
0.082 
 
0.234 
 
No shortcuts 2 
 
0.455 
 
0.134 
 
1.000 
 
0.470 
 
0.473 
 
not affected 
 
0.384 
 
0.082 
 
0.470 
 
1.000 
 
0.234 
 
Report me 
 
0.368 
 
0.234 
 
0.473 
 
0.234 
 
1.000 
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Table A.15 Correlation Matrix: Competence  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 All results p ≤ .001 
 
 
 
Knowledge gained 
 
Procedure emphasize 
 
Familiar 
 
Easily understand 
 
Co-worker familiar 
 
Knowledge gained 
 
1.000 
 
.445 
 
0.292 
 
0.386 
 
0.422 
 
Procedure emphasize 
 
0.445 
 
1.000 
 
0.576 
 
0.469 
 
0.500 
 
Familiar 
 
0.292 
 
0.576 
 
1.000 
 
0.640 
 
0.606 
 
Easily understand 
 
0.386 
 
0.469 
 
0.640 
 
1.000 
 
0.599 
 
Coworker familiar 
 
0.422 
 
0.500 
 
0.606 
 
0.599 
 
1.000 
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1.1.3 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)  
 
 The overall KMO statistic predicts whether the data is likely to factor well. This 
prediction is based on the correlation and partial correlation of the items. Moreover, the KMO 
indicates whether or not the survey can be duplicated in other studies (Table A.16). For example, 
the KMO values can make inference to the following question: 
Will the items pertaining to a factor produce the same grouping if administered to 
another demographic? 
KMO values of 0.6 or greater can predict successful replication of a survey instrument in 
other studies. Management commitment had the highest KMO value (0.857). And physical work 
environment had the lowest KMO value (0.673). Thus, the questionnaire’s generality is valid. 
 
Table A.16 KMO Values for Pre-planned Dimensions 1- 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-planned Dimension 
 
KMO Values 
Management commitment to safety 
 
0.875 
Communication of safety expectations/goals 
 
0.725 
Functionality of organizational safety 
 
0.791 
Physical Working Environment 
 
0.673 
Compliance with procedures 
 
0.710 
Competence  
 
0.802 
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1.1.4 Total Variance  
 
 Tables A.17 presents the total variance for each of the seven extracted factors. The total 
variance explained is the percent of variation in the responses to all the items pertaining to that 
factor. For example, the factor management commitment explained a percent variance of 53.4% 
among the set of items. This means that the factor of management commitment contains 53.4 % 
of the overall meaning of all the items combined. The factor of communication of safety goals 
and expectations had the highest value (61.9%). And the factor safety performance had the 
lowest value (20.66%). This means that the survey contained between 20 – 70% of the main 
areas of interest in this study. The low value of 20.66% may be a concern, but this extracted 
factor is only the combination of two items. These items did not fit well under the factor of 
functionality of organizational safety. Therefore, these two items were extracted to form a 
separate factor, safety performance. Safety performance addressed safety performance feedback 
and its role in promotion. 
 
Table A.17 Total % Variance for Extracted Factors 1 to 7 
Factors 
 
Total Variance Explained (%) 
Management commitment to safety 
 
53.403 
 Communication of safety expectations/goals 
 
61.903 
Functionality  
             Functionality of Organizational Safety 
            Safety Performance 
 
60.8 
40.197 
20.663 
Physical Working Environment 
 
59.899 
Compliance with procedures 
 
47.601 
Competence 
 
46.331 
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1.1.5 Communalities and Component Loadings 
 
Table A.18 presents the communalities and component loadings for each factor. 
Communality is the sum of the squared factor component loadings (for each item). It is also the 
variance in a single item accounted for by the factors. Communality is equivalent to the R2, a 
statistical parameter used in regression analysis to measure variation in an outcome variable. 
 For example, the item concerns addressed, had a communality of 64.8%. This indicates 
that 64.8% of the meaning of concerns addressed is explained by the factor, management 
commitment. The item awarded had a communality of 39.8%. This indicates that only 39.8% of 
the item awarded is represented by the factor management commitment. This implies that award 
and recognition are least represented by this factor. Communalities should have a value of .1 or 
greater. However, the value of .1 is relative to the rest of the values. 
The factor component loadings are the correlation coefficients between the variables and 
factors. Similar to Pearson’s r, the squared factor loading is the percent of variance in that 
variable explained by the factor. The square of the factor component loadings (Table A.18) are 
the communalities. The factor component loadings convey the reverse meaning of the 
communalities. The component loadings indicate the level of fit (“load”) in a factor. Component 
loadings of .4 or greater are considered a well structured factor, relative to the highest value. For 
example, the highest factor component loading for management commitment was concerns 
addressed = 0.805. The lowest component loading value for management commitment was 
award = 0.631. Both of these values were greater than 0.4. This means that all of these items 
addressing management commitment fit well together. 
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Table A.18 Communalities/Loading Values: Management Commitment to Safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A.19 presents the communalities and component loadings for factor 
communication of safety expectations/goals. The item communicated had the highest 
communality value of 78.3% for this factor. Receptive had the lowest communality value for this 
factor, 42.7%. This indicates that management’s receptiveness to employees’ concerns is least 
represented by the factor of communication of safety expectations/goals. The component 
loadings column in Table A.19 shows that communicated has the strongest loading of 0.885 on 
this factor. The item with the weakest loading had a value of 0.654, suggesting that all the items 
fit well together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communalities 
 
Loadings 
 
Concerns addressed 
 
0.648 
 
0.805 
 
Climate 
 
0.624 
 
0.790 
 
Properly staff 
 
0.595 
 
0.771 
 
Committed 
 
0.591 
 
0.769 
 
Examples 
 
0.481 
 
0.694 
 
Stop work 
 
0.401 
 
0.633 
 
Awarded 
 
0.398 
 
0.631 
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Table A.19 Communalities/Loading Values: Communication of Safety  
Expectations/Goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.20 presents the communalities and component factor loadings for the pre-planned 
dimension, functionality of organizational safety. The item timely investigation had the highest 
communality value of 70% for this dimension. Role in promotion had the lowest communality 
value of 45.9%. This indicates that safety performance role in promotion was least represented 
by these factors. However, from the initial analysis of the data, there were two factors contained 
within this pre-planned dimension. Therefore, the statements within this dimension had to be 
separated into two factors: functionality of organizational safety, and personnel safety 
performance feedback and evaluation. When there are two factors, the sum of the squared values 
of each “factor component loading” yields the “communality” value. 
 A varimax rotation was completed on the component loadings to eliminate discrepancies 
(noise) among the items. Discrepancies within the set of items (factor components loadings) are 
harder to distinguish (i.e., which item fits the best or the worst with the factor). Therefore, by 
performing a varimax rotation, the data can be viewed on a larger scale. Conceptually, this is like 
looking through a cylindrical pipe as opposed to looking at the pipe from the side. By so doing, 
interpretation of the data is easier, because factor component loadings can be clearly 
distinguished (i.e., highest or lowest). Therefore, after the varimax rotation, the component 
 
Communalities 
 
Loadings 
 
Communicated 
 
0.783 
 
0.885 
 
Define goals 
 
0.742 
 
0.861 
 
Report 
 
0.524 
 
0.724 
 
Receptive 
 
0.427 
 
0.654 
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loadings indicated that safety performance feedback and its role in promotion address a different 
factor. The item performance feedback had a value of 0.801. And the item role in promotion had 
a factor component loading value of 0.642. This indicates that these items fit well together on the 
factor of safety performance feedback. For the factor functionality of organizational safety, the 
item timely investigation had the highest factor component loading, and item enforcement had 
the lowest factor component loading of 0.596. This indicates that all the items fit well together in 
this single factor. 
 
Table A.20 Communalities/Loading Values: Functionality of Organizational Safety 
 
 
 Table A.21 presents the communalities and factor component loadings for the factor 
physical working environment. The item concerns repaired had the highest communality value 
of 64.6% for this factor. The item clean had the lowest communality value of 27.4% for this 
factor. This indicates that keeping the work environment clean and orderly is least represented by 
the factor physical working environment. The item concern repaired had the highest factor 
 
Communalities 
 
Loadings Component 1 & 2 (After Varimax Rotation) 
 
Timely investigation 
 
0.700 
 
0.836 
 
0.019 
 
Safety available 
 
0.696 
 
0.827 
 
0.112 
 
Investigated 
 
0.655 
 
0.806 
 
0.074 
 
Enforcement 2 
 
0.675 
 
0.668 
 
0.478 
 
Enforcement 
 
0.653 
 
0.596 
 
0.545 
 
Stop work 2 
 
0.388 
 
0.576 
 
0.237 
 
Performance feedback 
 
0.644 
 
-0.055 
 
0.801 
 
Role in promotion 
 
0.459 
 
0.217 
 
0.642 
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component loading value for this factor, 0.804. The item with the weakest factor component 
loading had a value of 0.524, suggesting that all the items fit well together. 
 
Table A.21 Communalities/Loading Values: Physical Working Environment 
 
 
 Table A.22 presents the communalities and factor component loadings for the factor 
compliance with procedures. The item No shortcut 2 (my co-worker will not ask me to take 
shortcuts) had the highest communality value of 62.8% for this factor. The item report co-
worker had the lowest communality value of 18.8% for this factor. This implies that co-workers 
reporting each other’s unsafe behaviors were represented least by the factor compliance with 
procedures. The item no shortcut 2 had the highest factor component loading value of 0.793 for 
this factor. The item with the weakest factor component loading had a value of 0.435, suggesting 
that all the items fit well together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communalities 
 
Loadings 
 
Concerns repaired 
 
0.646 
 
0.804 
 
Conditions 
 
0.587 
 
0.766 
 
Tools/equipments are adequate to perform my job 
safely 
0.397 
 
0.630 
 
Clean 
 
0.274 
 
0.524 
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Table A.22 Communalities/Loading Values: Compliance with Procedures 
 
 
 Table A.23 presents the communalities and factor component loadings for the factor 
competence. The item familiar had the highest communality value of 67.8% for this factor. The 
item knowledge gained had the lowest communality value of 39.8% for this factor. This implies 
that knowledge gained through training is least represented by the factor competence. The item 
familiar had the highest factor component loading value of 0.823 for this factor. The item with 
the weakest factor component loading had a value of 0.624, suggesting that all the items fit well 
together. 
 
 
Table A.23 Communalities/Loading Values: Competencies 
 
 
Communalities 
 
Loadings 
 
No shortcuts 2 
 
0.628 
 
0.793 
 
No shortcuts 
 
0.588 
 
0.767 
 
Report me 
 
0.480 
 
0.693 
 
Not affected 
 
0.431 
 
0.657 
 
Report co-workers 
 
0.189 
 
0.435 
 
 
Communalities 
 
Loadings 
 
Familiar 
 
0.678 
 
0.823 
 
Coworker familiar 
 
0.671 
 
0.819 
 
Easily understand 
 
0.659 
 
0.812 
 
Procedure emphasize 
 
0.598 
 
0.773 
 
Knowledge gained 
 
0.389 
 
0.624 
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1.1.6 Eigenvalues 
 
 The scree plots in Figures A.22, A.23, A.24, A.25, A.26, and A.27 plots the “eigenvalues” 
or “extraction sum of squared loadings,” which measure the units of variance (where the total 
number of units of variance is equal to the number of items) that are accounted for by each 
component. There are as many components as there are items, but only components with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 (using the Kaiser-Guttman criterion) are extracted as factors. When a 
factor is well-defined by strong correlations among the items, the result is a scree plot that has a 
sharp “elbow,” or bend, immediately following the first eigenvalue; this indicates that all the 
important information about the set of items is summarized in that single factor. A.22, A.23, 
A.24, A.25, A.26, and A.27  show well-defined single factors, as also shown by the 
communalities and factor loadings, for each dimension; however, Figure A.24 denotes the 
presence of two factors, as the “elbow” is less sharply defined. The principal component 
extraction method (PCE) reveals that the last two statements in this dimension do not reside in 
the dimension. Table A-3 presents the results of PCE following a rotation. The values predict 
that the two statements do fit a new separate dimension. Hence, a seventh category safety 
performance was established. 
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Figure A.22. Scree Plots: Management Commitment to Safety 
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Figure A.23. Scree Plots: Communication of Safety Expectations/Goals 
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Figure A.24. Scree Plots: Functionality of Organizational Safety 
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Figure A.25. Scree Plots: Physical Working Environment 
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Figure A.26. Scree Plots for Factor 5: Compliance with Procedures 
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Figure A.27. Scree Plots: Competencies 
 
1.2 Cronbach’s Alpha  
 
Once the factor analysis was completed, a Cronbach’s Alpha was used to ensure internal 
consistency of the items in a particular factor. Prior to calculating the average rating for each 
dimension, it was necessary to ensure that the items in a group had consistent responses from 
each participant. For example, if a participant responded favorably to the first item in a 
dimension, then it is assumed that the response rate for that dimension will be high. Similarly, if 
a participant responds negatively to the first item in a dimension, it is assumed that the response 
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
s 
Component Number 
54321
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
 114
rate for that dimension will be low. Internal consistency for a group of items is important 
because the average score of the items is a good representation of the individual responses only if 
each item is responded to similarly. To check for internal consistency of the seven dimensions 
the statistic Cronbach’s Alpha was used. A Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.7 or greater is 
considered appropriate. The value of 0.7 is relative to the number of questions contained in the 
dimension (Garson, 2007). For example, 0.6 is considered high if a category only contains five 
or less questions. However, a category that contains ten or more questions is only considered 
internally consistent with a value of 0.8 or greater. The Cronbach’s Alpha values for the seven 
dimensions are listed in Table 4-15. Values indicated that all seven dimensions had internal 
consistency. 
 
Table A.24 Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Number of Items 
Management Commitment 
 
0.851 7 
Communication 
 
0.780 4 
Functionality of Safety 
Systems 
 
0.853 6 
Safety performance 
 
0.369 2 
Physical Environment 
 
0.628 4 
Interpersonal Relationship 
 
0.702 5 
Competence 
 
0.814 5 
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APPENDIX B: SAFETY CLIMATE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EMPLOYEES 
 
Please rate the following statements about your organization. Your rating should reflect your 
opinions and beliefs. Use the following five-point scale in your rating: 
 
1 - Strongly Disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 - Strongly Agree 
 
Management commitment  
to safety Strongly Disagree  
Strongly 
Agree
 Managers are committed to safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
Safety is given priority over productivity. 1 2 3 4 5 
Managers are always examples of 
appropriate safety procedures. 1 2 3 4 5 
Work will not begin until we are properly 
staffed to perform work safely. 1 2 3 4 5 
Exemplary safety performance is 
recognized/awarded. 1 2 3 4 5 
Employees are authorized to stop work 
process if hazards arise. 1 2 3 4 5 
Reports of safety concerns are addressed 
appropriately. 1 2 3 4 5 
Communication of safety 
expectations/goals 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
Company safety performance is widely 
communicated.  1 2 3 4 5 
Management clearly defines/emphasize 
safety performance expectations/goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
Top management is receptive when 
middle management expresses their 
concerns with maintaining appropriate 
safety level. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Supervisors are always receptive to 
reports of safety concerns.  1 2 3 4 5 
The functionality  
of organizational safety 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
Safety personnel are authorized to stop 
production in case of a safety concern. 1 2 3 4 5 
Safety personnel are available in a timely 
manner to address safety concerns. 1 2 3 4 5 
Accidents are thoroughly investigated  1 2 3 4 5 
Accident investigation recommendations 
are implemented in a timely manner. 1 2 3 4 5 
I receive safety performance feedback 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
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during my employee evaluation. 
Personnel safety record play role in 
evaluation for promotion process. 1 2 3 4 5 
Safety staff enforces safe working 
practices on employees. 1 2 3 4 5 
Safety staff enforces safe working 
practices on managers. 1 2 3 4 5 
Physical Working  
Environment 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
Working conditions (noise, temperature, 
lighting, required work posture, etc.) are 
comfortable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Safety concerns (electrical faults, broken 
ladder, spills etc.) are repaired in a timely 
manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tools/equipments are adequate to 
perform my job safely.  1 2 3 4 5 
We are required to keep our work areas 
clean and in order.  1 2 3 4 5 
Compliance with  
Procedures 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
We do not take safety shortcuts at work 
(not following safety procedures). 1 2 3 4 5 
Supervisors encourage us to report co-
workers who take safety shortcuts. 1 2 3 4 5 
My co-workers will not ask me to take 
shortcuts. 1 2 3 4 5 
My relationship with my co-workers will 
NOT be affected if I refuse to take safety 
shortcuts 
1 2 3 4 5 
My co-workers will report my behavior if 
I take a safety shortcut  1 2 3 4 5 
Competence Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
The knowledge I gained from safety 
training helps me to perform my work 
safely. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Policies and procedures strongly 
emphasize safe working practices.  1 2 3 4 5 
Supervisors are familiar with safety 
requirements specified in the 
policies/procedures.  
1 2 3 4 5 
I can easily understand safety documents 
and their meaning. 1 2 3 4 5 
My co-workers are familiar with safety 
requirements specified in the 
policies/procedures.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
5 
6 
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APPENDIX C: DECISION SCENARIO 
 
DECISION SCENARIO - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 
 
You are employed by a steel manufacturing plant. During day to day routine activities one  
Co-workers suggest taking a short cut in implementation for one of the standard operating 
procedures. Your decision will have implications in the following dimensions: 
 
1. Peer Pressure from the person making the suggestion;  
2. Safety;  
3. Productivity; and  
4. Promotion 
 
You have the following four alternatives:  
 
1. Ignore: Just ignore the suggestion and continue with work. 
2. Report without details: Disagree with the suggestion and report the event without mentioning 
names in the situation. 
3. Agree: Agree with the suggested short cut. 
4. Report with details: Disagree with the suggestion and report the event including names and 
situation.  
 
When you are ready, follow the steps below in order to initiate and complete the simulation:  
 
STEP 1: Assign weight to each one of the decision factors on the far right column on a scale of 0  
 – 10, 0 being not important and 10 being very important. 
STEP 2: Click SELECT to view information that relates a decision factor to an alternative 
(Decision factors are located on the left column and alternatives on the upper 
row). The values at the bottom of the cells are given on a 21-point scale, where -
10 implies that an alternative is evaluated very unfavorably, 0 implies a neutral 
position, and 10 implies a very favorable evaluation of the alternative with respect 
to the specific decision factor.  
STEP 3: Based on the features you’ve selected, choose the best alternative by clicking on the 
 Final Choice button, at the lowest rubric in this alternative’s column. 
STEP 4: Confirm your choice by clicking Final Decision 
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Please remember to select at least one implication and one decision. 
 
 Alternative 1 
 
Just ignore
Alternative 2
  
Report without Details
Alternative 3 
 
Agree
Alternative 4 
 
Report with details
Dimension 1  
 
Peer Pressure 
This alternative will not 
establish peer pressure since 
the event was not reported. 
 
 
Rating 10
Reporting without details may 
establish slight peer pressure 
due to the broadcasting of the 
event.  
 
Rating -5 
Agreeing to take short cut 
will make you look friendly 
and a person that can be 
trusted. 
 
Rating 10 
Reporting with details will 
establish significant peer pressure 
and my result in social isolation. 
 
 
Rating -10
Dimension 2  
 
 Safety 
Not reporting might lead 
taking short cuts a norm and 
may lead to severe safety 
events. 
 
Rating -7 
Report without details may 
establish a prevention 
program that will reduce the 
likelihood of re-occurrences. 
 
Rating 6 
Agreeing to take short cut 
not only may lead to a safety 
event but may cause harm to 
you. 
 
Rating -7 
Report with details will have major 
impact on reducing the likelihood 
of re-occurrences since employees 
will corrective actions against 
them. 
Rating 10 
Dimension 3  
 
Productivity 
Taking short cuts will 
prevent slow down of work 
process and will maintain 
productivity at high level. 
However, should safety 
occur productivity will 
completely stop. 
 
Rating 7 
Reporting without details will 
potentially slow down 
productivity due to the need 
to adequately follow the 
standard operation procedure.
 
 
 
Rating -3
Taking short cuts will 
prevent slow down of work 
process and will maintain 
productivity at high level. 
However, should safety 
occur productivity will 
completely stop. 
 
Rating 7 
Reporting with details will 
potentially slow down productivity 
due to the need to adequately 
follow the standard operation 
procedure. 
 
 
 
Rating -5
Dimension 4  
 
Promotion 
Not reporting will have no 
impact on promotion. 
 
 
 
 
Rating 0
Reporting without details will 
put you in a positive light in 
the eyes of your supervisor; 
Thus the likelihood of getting 
promoted increases. 
 
Rating 6 
Agreeing to take short cut 
will have no impact on 
promotion. 
 
 
 
Rating 0 
Reporting with details will put you 
in a strong positive light in the 
eyes of your supervisor; The 
likelihood of getting promoted is 
higher than in any other case. 
 
Rating 10 
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